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Introduction
The Internet's rapid growth provides a striking example of the
effect of computer networks on modern communication. In 1992, esti-
mates of the number of users on the Internet varied between ten and
twenty-five million.' The Internet's growth has been exponential: "In
1981, 213 computers were registered on the Internet; by 1989 there
were 80,000. In October 1990, there were 313,000; only three months
later, in January 1991, there were 376,000. And in January 1992, there
were 727,000 Internet registered computers."2 The Internet's growth
rate is estimated at between 10 and 15 percent per month.3
This communications potential has generated numerous enthusi-
astic reviews:
Networks have already changed the way America communi-
cates. Each day, millions of transactions zip across tens of
thousands of high-speed connections among computers spread
all over the world. It takes only seconds to transmit hundreds of
pages across the United States. Requests reach England, Japan,
or Australia with a fficker of the computer screen and answers
arrive well before a telephone call or fax transmission could be
completed. Software stored on a mainframe in California can
1. PAUL GILSTER, THm INTERNET NAVIGATOR 15 (2d ed. 1994); see R.E. Calem, The
Network of All Networks, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 6, 1992, at F12.
2. TRAcY LAQUEY & JEANNE C. RYER, THm INTERNET COMPANION A BEGINNER'S
GUIDE TO GLOBAL NETWORKING 7 (1993) (citation omitted). LaQuey and Ryer note that
at this rate of expansion, 1.5 million computers would have been connected to the Internet
by the time of their book's publication in 1993. Id. In addition, each computer "regis-
tered" on the Internet can provide access for numerous individuals and information gate-
ways to other computers on other networks. See GILSTER, supra note 1, at 18-20. A
measurement of the number of computer networks connected by the Internet reveals simi-
lar growth:
[B]y 1985, approximately one hundred networks formed the Internet. By 1989,
that number had risen to five hundred. The Network Information Center of the
Defense Data Network Information Center found 2218 networks connected as of
January 1990. By June 1991, the National Science Foundation Network Informa-
tion Center pegged it at close to four thousand, and ... connections have more
than quadrupled since then. If we extrapolate based on current numbers, the
Internet could reach forty million people by 1995, one hundred million by 1998.
Id. at 15.
3. GILSTER, supra note 1, at 23 (stating the Internet's current growth rate is 15% each
month); LAQuEY & RYER, supra note 2, at 6 (10% monthly).
be downloaded instantly to a desktop in New York using a few
simple commands. Researchers from universities and corporate
development labs who have never met face to face collaborate
on-line to develop and test a new product, saving months or
even years in the process.4
The revolutionary potential of computer networks such as the In-
ternet easily justifies such enthusiasm. The ability to instantaneously
communicate with enormous numbers of people without regard to dis-
tance will affect the business environment, 5 the political process,6 and
may even alter the way we communicate on a personal level.7
The changed medium of communication, however, is unlikely to
change the subject of communication. "Sex, a great and mysterious
motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of absorb-
ing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital
problems of human interest and public concern." 8 In addition, just as
there are those with an absorbing interest in discussing sex, there are
those with an equally absorbing interest in enforcing societal stan-
dards of sexual morality. 9 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the
4. MARY J. CRONIN, DOING BusrNFss ON THE INTERNE:. How THE ELECTRONIC
HIGHWAY IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN COMPANIES 1 (1994).
5. See e.g., id. (book about the importance of network connectivity for business);
Peter H. Lewis, The Executive Computer: More Home Workers and More Machines in
Their Offices, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, at C10 (describing the significant growth in the
number of people working from their homes).
6. For example, the President is connected to the Internet at "presi-
dent@whitehouse.gov" and during the 1992 presidential campaign, the Clinton campaign's
press releases were distributed over the Internet. See GILSTER, supra note 1, at 7. Also,
Supreme Court opinions are accessible at "ftp.cwru.edu." Id. at 11. The increase in two-
way communications in electronic media may revolutionize how political campaigns will be
conducted. See, e.g., Dane Smith, Bouza's Gizmos: His High-Tech 'Hey Tony' Campaign
Uses E-Mail Faxes, STAR TRIB., Feb. 8, 1994, at B1 (use of electronic communications in
local political campaign).
7. See, e.g., Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, Cyberspouse: Online Romance Leads To-What
Else?-Electronic Marriage, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1994, at CIO.
8. United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
9. Governmental authority has probably been invoked to regulate or silence sexual
speech in every existing form of communication. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380
(1957) (books); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (use of the mail); Paris Adult Thea-
tre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (motion picture theaters); Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (drive-in motion pictures); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (broadcasting); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (sale of films); Pope v.
Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (magazines); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989) (sexually related telephone services); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (photo-
graphs); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (nude dancing).
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battle between freedom of expression and moral regulation has been
waged on the fertile ground of the computer network. 10
The First Amendment protects against most governmental at-
tempts to control the content of one's speech.' Sexual expression,
however, is not given the same protection provided for other topics of
communication.' 2 The Supreme Court has interpreted the First
Amendment to allow extensive regulation of the circumstances under
which "indecent" speech can be communicated. 13 In addition, "ob-
scene" speech has been excepted from First Amendment protection
entirely.' 4  Once labelled "obscene," speech can be banned and
criminalized.
Under the test currently used by the Supreme Court to determine
whether sexual speech is "obscene," the sexual speech must be offen-
sive in light of "community standards."' 5 The "community" used to
define such standards can be a state or a locality, or it can be left
entirely to a jury to determine which community's standards are appli-
cable. 6 In the context of national computer networks, it is impossible
to determine what material in the vast amount of information passing
across a network could be found offensive according to the standards
of all of the vaguely defined communities from which one may con-
nect to the network.' 7 In its application to computer networks, the
Court's obscenity test is so vague and unpredictable that it will force
speakers on those networks to censor constitutionally protected
speech out of fear that some authority somewhere may find the
speech too offensive. 8
10. The recent attempts in Congress to regulate sexually related materials on the In-
ternet provide a clear example of the ongoing battle between freedom of expression and
moral regulation. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Senate Bill Escalates Computer-Smut Debate, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 16, 1995, at D4; Mike Mills & Elizabeth Corcoran, Senate Votes to Ban PC
Network "Obscenity," WASH. Posr, June 15, 1995, at Al; Daniel Pearl, House Leaders
Seek Other Ways to Fight Smut on the Internet, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1995, at B2; infra note
261.
11. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. For the purposes of this
Article, the term "speech" will be used to describe all forms of communication: written,
auditory, visual, tactile, or olfactory.
12. See NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE
FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 50-54 (1995).
13. See infra notes 240-261 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 66-83 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 66-83 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 216-220 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 216-220 and accompanying text.
The Court's reliance on local community standards in determin-
ing whether sexual speech is sufficiently offensive makes the obscenity
test wholly arbitrary in its application to national computer networks.
In addition, it betrays the fallacy underlying the Court's obscenity ju-
risprudence. The "obscenity exception" to the First Amendment rests
upon a view of the community as a discrete, homogenous, geographi-
cally defined locale. 19 This view of the community is questionable
when applied to our modem, highly integrated, metropolitan society.
When the increased communications capabilities of computer net-
works and their potential to revolutionize human interaction are
taken into account, the Court's definition of "community" is
inadequate.20
The Court's view of the community as a discrete, homogeneous
"hamlet" also underlies its decision to define obscenity as a question
of fact.21 Because "obscenity" has been defined as a factual question,
the determination of whether a work is offensive is largely left to a
jury.2 With the development of international computer networks, the
increased diversity of opinion and experience that will follow from
increased interaction between formerly isolated localities makes it im-
possible to continue to assume that there is a definable and predict-
able standard by which juries may prohibit "offensive" speech.'
Instead, the impossibility of predicting the reactions of differing juries
in differing locales, in combination with the impossibility of prevent-
ing those in any given geographic location from gaining access to sex-
ual material, will force both speakers and network service providers to
censor sexual speech according to arbitrary "safe" standards. Speech
that is supposedly protected by the First Amendment will thereby be
eliminated.24
Even in the diverse world of computer networks, however, poten-
tially offensive sexually related speech need not be left entirely unreg-
ulated. While this Article recommends that the "obscenity exception"
to the First Amendment be abandoned, speech can be appropriately
regulated to protect unwilling listeners from offense and limit access
to sexual material by children.25 Such regulations, however, must still
carefully balance the individuals' right to express themselves and to
19. See infra notes 204-210 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 212-220 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 223-229 and accompanying text.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 115-120.
23. See infra notes 223-229 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 216-220 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 231-239 and accompanying text.
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receive information with the society's right to maintain moral
standards.26
I. Communications on the Internet
The First Amendment's "obscenity exception" does not properly
translate to the modem world of high-speed communication, regard-
less of the medium of transmission. Because of the Internet's expan-
sive growth and pervasive use, however, this Article will focus on the
communication tools available on the Internet to demonstrate how
prohibition of "obscene" speech on computer networks will be both
ineffective and arbitrary. Before discussing how the conceptual un-
derpinnings of the obscenity exception fail to apply in the digital uni-
verse, it is necessary to examine the communication facilities available
on modem computer networks.
While many commercial networks such as CompuServe or Prod-
igy may be operated by a single entity, the Internet is itself a collec-
tion of networks with only nominal central authority.2 7 Beyond the
maintenance of technical protocols, there is no centralized control
over the types of communications that take place across the Internet,
and no central organization has the authority to enforce a policy limit-
ing the contents of communication traveling across the network.28 In
addition, users on the Internet have a wide variety of means of com-
munication. Users can communicate over the Internet via electronic
mail, electronic discussion lists, direct "real-time" conversations, pub-
lic "news" groups, and file transfers.
A. Electronic Mail
Electronic mail is the most widely used single application on the
Internet.29 Simply put, "[e]lectronic mail provides the ability to send
messages by computer."30 Like ordinary, nonelectronic mail, elec-
tronic mail consists of nothing more than a message "mailed" from
one user to another. Electronic mail is extremely fast, and can be sent
with equal ease to a single addressee or a long list of addressees. In
26. See infra notes 240-261 and accompanying text.
27. See BRENDAN P. KEHOE, ZEN AND THE ART OF THE INTERNET 4-5 (1993)
(describing the Internet, UUCP network, and BITNET, the three major communications
networks in the United States). Each of these networks is interconnected so that enor-
mous amounts of traffic flow among them. Id
28. See G.STER, supra note 1, at 33-42 (describing the organizations that coordinate
Internet activities "to a greater or lesser extent").
29. See LAQrEY & RvmR, supra note 2, at 42.
30. GILSTER, supra note 1, at 153.
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addition to text, graphic images and other nontextual data may be
transferred by electronic mail.31 While a single electronic mail
message may be widely distributed, electronic mail is essentially a pri-
vate communication between individuals.
B. E-mail Discussion Lists
E-mail discussion lists (or "mailing lists") are essentially group
conversations distributed via electronic mail.32 Members of a mailing
list "subscribe" by entering their names on a list. Each member who
wishes to contribute to the discussion mails her contribution to a com-
mon address where the contributions are compiled into a single
message and remailed to all subscribers of the mailing list.33 While
these discussions are limited to those on the mailing list and pass
through the otherwise private medium of electronic mail, they are
generally accessible to anyone who knows how to subscribe to them.3
C. E-mail Services
Other services can be obtained through electronic mail. For ex-
ample, automated servers at several locations on the Internet provide
database services through electronic mail. These services include
"white pages" directories, requests for specific documents, and file
transfers. One uses these services by mailing a request to the auto-
mated server, which then mails the requested information back.3 5
D. "News" and Public Discussion
The Internet "news" provides a seemingly infinite number of
public discussion groups.3 6 These groups are similar to electronic
mailing lists in their operation. There are literally thousands of
"newsgroups," each discussing a different topic. Individuals post sub-
missions to these newsgroups, which are then propagated across the
Internet to everyone else reading that group. Many of the news-
31. The technology for sending nontextual images via electronic mail is still in its in-
fancy, however. See LAQuEY & RYER, supra note 2, at 43.
32. See KEHOE, supra note 27, at 11-13; GILS=ER, supra note 1, at 151-94; LAQuEY &
RYER, supra note 2, at 54-62.
33. See LAQUEY & RYER, supra note 2, at 54.
34. Lists of mailing lists are kept in commonly known locations on the Internet, so it is
not difficult to determine how to subscribe to most of the mailing lists. See Gu.sMR, supra
note 1, at 261.
35. See GMSTER, supra note 1, at 195-227.
36. Search of rss@dvirginia.edu (March 25, 1994) (author's computer account at the
University of Virginia provided access to 2458 separate newsgroups over Usenet, the In-
ternet news service).
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groups contain discussion and material on sexual topics.3 7 There is no
central determination as to which newsgroups will be made available
to the users of any individual computer system. Instead, the individ-
ual system owners decide how many of these groups to carry and how
much storage space will be devoted to storing the enormous amount
of material passing through as "news." 38
E. Direct "Real-time" Conversation
Users may also use the Internet to engage in interactive discus-
sions. For example, a program called "talk" allows two users to simul-
taneously type messages to each other. In addition, a feature called
"Internet Relay Chat" enables multiple parties to engage in on-line
conferences.39
F. File Transfer and Remote Log In
Finally, the Internet contains an enormous amount of archived
information that is generally available to anyone who makes a re-
quest. One can access these archives via two different means. File
transfer programs allow a user to either upload files to an archive or
to download files from the archives to the user's computer. In addi-
tion, a remote log-in program allows an individual to log into an
archive computer over the Internet.40 Once logged in, the individual
becomes a user of that remote computer and can access material
stored there. The individual can often remotely log into yet another
computer, making a connection from the user's original computer
through the first remote computer to the second remote computer.41
37. Search of alt.sex (March 20-25, 1994) (608 contributions covering a wide range of
sexually related topics). This newsgroup is one of the most widely read groups in the In-
ternet news system. See Pat Craig, A Web of Seduction, PrrrsBURGH POsT-GAzETrE, Mar.
12, 1996, at D1. Groups such as rec.arts.erotica carry erotic poetry or written stories. See
id Other groups, such as alt.sex.bondage (for those interested in bondage and dominance)
or alt.sex.fetish.feet (for those with foot fetishes), cater to those with more unusual sexual
tastes. See John P. Barlow, Thinking Locally, Acting Globally, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 76.
Some Internet newsgroups, such as alt.binaries.pictures.erotica, carry digitized erotic pic-
tures, although in a form that requires decoding before such pictures can be viewed. See
Richard Gehr et al., Best of the Net, VILLA E Voicn, Apr. 2, 1996, at 21. Finally, some
groups focus on an issue that is not intrinsically sexual, but carry a fair amount of sexually
related material that some may consider abnormal, such as alt.homosexual. See Gay
Group Criticizes On-Line Censorship, UPI, Dec. 29, 1995, available in NEXIS, News Li-
brary, Curnews File.
38. See KEHOE, supra note 27, at 28-29; LAQuBY & RYBR, supra note 2, at 60-62;
GLSTER, supra note 1, at 292-93.
39. See GILSTER, supra note 1, at 428-31.
40. See id at 135-36.
41. For an easily comprehensible description of this process, see id. at 14041.
The variety of services available over the Internet makes it possi-
ble for a single user to use any one of several means to gain access to
particular information. Mailing lists, for example, often appear as
newsgroups on the Internet news.42 A file can be requested via elec-
tronic mail from an automated database server, or it can be trans-
ferred directly via a file transfer.4 3 Because of the number of users on
the Internet, enormous amount of publicly available information, lack
of central authority, and wide spectrum of available tools, strict con-
trols on any topic of discussion or type of information will be nearly, if
not completely, impossible to enforce.
II. Obscenity and the First Amendment
A. The Evolution of the Obscenity Test
American obscenity regulation traditionally has rested upon a ge-
ographically oriented paradigm that is both inaccurate and oppressive
when applied to a modern, integrated society. The development of
obscenity law and the articulated justifications for its existence show
that the problem goes beyond the obvious misapplication of "local"
community standards to national high-speed communications media
such as computer networks. Instead, the "obscenity exception" itself
rests upon underlying geographically based justifications that simply
cannot apply in any meaningful sense to modem computer networks
and other international high-speed communications systems.
B. Early Constitutional Considerations and Pre-Roth
"Obscenity" Tests
Prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was as-
sumed that the states had authority to regulate expression to protect
public morality." No constitutional limitations were placed upon the
states' power to regulate sexually related expression until the
Supreme Court applied the First Amendment's protection of speech
42. See id. at 225-26.
43. See id. at 117.
44. Justice William Brennan has provided a brief history of state regulation of
obscenity:
The guaranties of freedom of expression in effect in 10 of the 14 States which by
1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave no absolute protection for every utter-
ance. Thirteen of the 14 States provided for the prosecution of libel, and all of
those States made either blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes. As
early as 1712, Massachusetts made it criminal to publish "any filthy, obscene, or
profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon"....
Roth v, United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957) (citations and footnotes omitted).
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and press to the states by incorporating that protection into the Four-
teenth Amendment.45 Early state regulation of obscenity was primar-
ily aimed at preventing "immoral" thoughts or the immoral tendencies
that may follow from speech advocating an immoral position.46
Following the passage of the first federal obscenity statute in
1842,4 7 early federal cases upheld the federal government's power to
regulate sexual speech in specific fora. During this period, the
Supreme Court upheld Congress's ability to prohibit the mailing of
matter "deemed injurious to the public morals." 48 The congressional
authority to regulate sexual material in the mail was based on the ar-
gument that use of the mail was a privilege upon which conditions
could be imposed.49 Although this doctrine was eventually aban-
doned,50 the Supreme Court continued to assume that Congress had
the power to prohibit obscenity.5 ' Although no explicit "obscenity ex-
45. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
46. For example, the Indiana Supreme Court expounded, in extremely purple prose,
upon the need to prevent the mailing of obscene or indecent material to directly protect
the minds and chastity of young girls and to indirectly protect the family and community:
The plain and manifest object of the legislature in the enactment of [the statute at
issue] ... was to guard and protect the public morals by erecting barriers which
the evil-minded, lewd, and lascivious may not safely pass. The moral worth of
every community rests with the family. It is the source from which comes the
ever-flowing current that brings with it lessons of probity and chastity. With that
fountain-head corrupted, decay and overthrow will surely follow. It is there that
the youth are taught that honesty and virtue are above price. It is there that the
girls, in the innocence and purity of their youth, are nurtured and guarded against
the wiles and intrigues of the wicked and the seducer. If they may be approached
and insulted upon the streets with impunity by the vile and depraved, or if the
same class may, with impunity, override the barrier that protects the home, and
reach the young girls sheltered there, through the public mails, by letters sent to
them which teach, or attempt to teach, them that voluptuousness is more to be
desired than true womanhood, and that virtue had better be exchanged for sexual
dissipation, then, indeed, there is a crying necessity for further legislation.
Thomas v. State, 2 N.E. 808, 809-10 (Ind. 1885).
47. Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 28, 5 Stat. 548, 566-67 (1842).
48. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1877).
49. IL ("In excluding various articles from the mail, the object of Congress has not
been to interfere with the freedom of the press, or with any other rights of the people; but
to refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public
morals."); see In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
50. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505 n.5 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
51. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene ... ."); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) ("Though we can
see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled
to the protection of free speech as the best of literature. They are equally subject to con-
trol if they are lewd, indecent, obscene, or profane.") (citations omitted). Note that these
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ception" to the First Amendment was adopted, the federal courts ini-
tially used an approach similar to that of the state courts: they focused
primarily on the regulation of sexual morality as a justification for reg-
ulating speech.52 For example, letters arranging assignations for the
purpose of committing adultery were prohibited from the mails, even
when no obscene words were used.53
Following the passage of the Comstock Act54 in 1873, a wave of
federal obscenity prosecutions forced the courts to formulate a defini-
tion of "obscenity."55 United States v. Bennett 6 provided an early
standard. In Bennett, a federal court of appeals adopted an obscenity
test used in the English case of Regina v. Hicklin.57 Under the Hicklin
test, a work could be adjudged obscene based upon the effect that
selected passages from the work would have upon the most suscepti-
ble members of the population.58 This standard was followed by nu-
merous federal courts.59
Other courts, however, rejected the Hicklin test. The Second Cir-
cuit, in particular, refused to apply the Hicklin test in a series of cases
including United States v. Dennett,60 United States v. One Book Enti-
tled Ulysses,61 and United States v. Levine.62 Instead, the Second Cir-
cases are actually Fourteenth Amendment cases, as they involve regulation of speech by
states. In the area of speech regulation, the Court has given the First and Fourteenth
Amendments equal force. See infra notes 223-229 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446, 451 (1896) ("The words 'ob-
scene,' 'lewd' and 'lascivious,' as used in the statute, signify that form of immorality which
has relation to sexual impurity, and have the same meaning as is given them at common
law in prosecutions for obscene libel."); United States v. Males, 51 F. 41, 43 (D. Ind. 1892)
(holding that federal statute intended to prohibit mailing of matter "calculated to excite
the animal passions, and to corrupt and debauch the mind, and not such as are merely
coarse, vulgar, or indecent"); United States v. Moore, 104 F. 78 (D. Ky. 1900) (holding
federal statute was not passed to protect or obstruct religious thought, but to prevent the
use of the mail for promoting immoral tendencies). The courts focused upon whether the
material would tend to corrupt the morals of the reader. See, e.g., Knowles v. United
States, 170 F. 409 (8th Cir. 1909); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
The statute referred to in these cases is the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1993),
which forbids mailing an "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy, or vile article, matter,
thing, device, or substance," or mailing solicitations for such material.
53. See United States v. Martin, 50 F. 918 (W.D. Va. 1892).
54. Ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873).
55. See Ronald D. Gray, Note, Balancing Community Standards Against Constitutional
Freedoms of Speech and Press: Pope v. Illinois, 41 Sw. L.J. 1023, 1028 (1987).
56. 24 F. Cas. 1093 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571).
57. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
58. See Bennett, 24 F. Cas. at 1104.
59. See Gray, supra note 55, at 1028 & n.45.
60. 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
61. 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
62. 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
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cuit adopted a test that required that obscenity be judged by the
dominant effect the allegedly obscene work would have on the aver-
age person in the community.63 As time progressed, many courts
adopted the Second Circuit's standard,' although the Hicklin test was
also frequently used.65
C. The Roth-Memoirs Obscenity Test
In Roth v. United States,66 the Supreme Court directly confronted
the permissible extent of obscenity regulation under both the First and
Fourteenth Amendments for the first time.67 A majority of the Court
found "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance." 68 As a
result, "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press. ' 69 In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted the
logic of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which held that some "utter-
ances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."70
Although it placed obscene speech entirely outside the bounds of
First Amendment protection, Roth's definition of "obscenity" pro-
vided some procedural protection for sexual speech in general. The
Court attempted to limit the reach of the obscenity exception to en-
sure that "the standards for judging obscenity safeguard the protec-
tion of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest."71 Before material
could be labeled "obscene," it had to be shown that "to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."'T
63. Id. at 158.
64. See Gray, supra note 55, at 1029 & n.51 (stating that "most courts accepted the
dominant effect standard" and citing relevant cases).
65. See i& at 1029 & n.52.
66. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
67. The Court applied the same standard for obscenity to the state governments under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and to the federal government under
the First Amendment. Roth, 354 U.S. at 493 n.31. But see infra notes 147-165 and accom-
panying text (discussing Justice Harlan's disagreement with this approach).
68. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
69. Id.
70. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
71. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488.
72. Id at 489 (citations omitted).
As interpreted by later cases, Roth provided a three-part test for
judging whether a work is obscene, although Roth itself did not specif-
ically divide its standard in this way. In Memoirs v. Massachusetts, a
plurality of the Court characterized Roth "as elaborated in subsequent
cases" as requiring three elements:
It must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the mate-
rial taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representa-
tion of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without
redeeming social value.73
Although the exact formulation used by the Memoirs plurality
was never adopted by a majority of the Court, the requirements that
an obscene work appeal to the prurient interest, be patently offensive,
and lack social value were generally accepted. 74
Roth's adoption of "community standards" as the benchmark for
determining whether material appeals to prurient interest was one of
the central aspects of the opinion. Roth rejected the Hicklin test,
which allowed a work to be judged obscene by its effect upon particu-
larly susceptible persons. 75 Instead, the Court approved a jury in-
struction stating:
The test is not whether [the allegedly obscene work] would
arouse sexual desires or sexual[ly] impure thoughts in those
comprising a particular segment of the community, the young,
the immature or the highly prudish[,] or would leave another
segment, the scientific or highly educated or the so-called
worldly-wise and sophisticated[,] indifferent and unmoved ....
The test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or
publication considered as a whole, not upon any particular class,
but upon all those whom it is likely to reach. In other words,
you determine its impact upon the average person in the com-
munity .... You may ask yourselves does it offend the common
conscience of the community by present-day standards. 76
In Roth, however, the Court provided no guidance as to how to
define the "community" from which the tastes of the "average" per-
son could be abstracted.
73. 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (plurality opinion).
74. See, e.g., Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962) (holding that
"[o]bsenity... requires proof of two distinct elements: (1) patent offensiveness; and (2)
'prurient interest' appeal"); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) ("[A] work cannot
be proscribed unless it is 'utterly' without social importance.").
75. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89.
76. Id. at 490.
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In the years following Roth, the Court's attempts to determine
when material was obscene "produced a variety of views among the
members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitu-
tional adjudication. '77 During this period, the Court made several im-
portant refinements to its obscenity standard. The Court prohibited
not only convictions for possession of obscene materials unless some
degree of scienter is proven,78 but also the banning of a film or book
merely because immoral ideas were advocated.7 9 The Court con-
cluded that the circumstances of production, sale, and publicity of ma-
terial are relevant in determining whether that material has social
value.80 The Court modified the prurient interest standard so that the
"appeals to prurient interest" test is satisfied when material designed
for a deviant sexual group appeals to the deviant group's prurient in-
terest.8' The Court also concluded that obscenity can be defined in
relation to its appeal to minors when prohibiting the sale of sexual
material to minors.' Throughout this period, however, the Justices
77. Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676,704-05 (1968) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). For example:
By 1967 the following views had emerged: Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Douglas consistently maintained that government is wholly powerless to regulate
any sexually oriented matter on the ground of its obscenity. Mr. Justice
Harlan... believed that the Federal Government. . . could control the distribu-
tion of "hard core" pornography, while the States were afforded more latitude to
"[ban] any material which.., has been reasonably found in state judicial proceed-
ings to treat with sex in a fundamentally offensive manner, under rationally estab-
lished criteria for judging such material." Mr. Justice Stewart regarded "hard
core" pornography as the limit of both federal and state power.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, at 80-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). The remaining members of the Court had each adopted some variation of the
Roth test. Id. at 81.
78. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1959) (holding some level of scienter is
required to convict the bookseller for possession of obscene books because the owner of a
bookstore need not know the contents of every book in the store).
79. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959)
(holding a film may not be banned merely because it advocates the idea that adultery may
be proper behavior).
80. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 420 (1966) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he
circumstances of production, sale, and publicity are relevant in determining whether a
book ... [has] redeeming social importance."); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,
470-74 (1966) (stating that, because representation of publications as erotically arousing
heightens the offensiveness of the publications and is relevant to determining whether the
work has social importance, "in close cases evidence of pandering may be probative" in
determining obscenity).
81. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966).
82. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968).
continued to disagree over the definition of "community" in the ap-
praisal of "community standards.1 83
D. The Stanley Exception
In 1969, Stanley v. Georgia added a new factor to obscenity analy-
sis by holding that states cannot outlaw mere private possession of
obscene materials. s4 The Court viewed a law prohibiting possession
of obscene materials as an attempt to "protect the individual's mind
from the effects of obscenity." 5 In response to Georgia's argument
that it had the right to protect an individual's mind from the effects of
obscenity, the Court stated that "[w]e are not certain that this argu-
ment amounts to anything more than the assertion that the State has
the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts." 6 The
Court concluded:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving gov-
ernment the power to control men's minds. 7
Stanley represents a departure from previous obscenity analysis.
For the first time in an obscenity case, the Court rested its decision, at
least in part, on the individual's right to receive information.8 In ad-
dition, the Court rejected the argument that obscenity could be pro-
hibited because it would lead to impure thoughts,8 9 even though
earlier regulation of sexual speech was clearly designed to control the
moral content of the hearer's thoughts.9" Finally, the Court refused to
accept Georgia's justification that exposure to obscene materials may
lead to sexual deviance or crime.91 The Court avoided Roth's appar-
83. Compare Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524, 524 (1970) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(advocating local standard of decency) and Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200-01 (War-
ren, C.J., dissenting) (same) with id. at 193 (plurality opinion) (advocating national stan-
dard in all prosecutions) and Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (plurality
decision) (advocating national standard of decency in federal prosecution).




88. See id. at 564, 568.
89. Id at 565.
90. See supra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
91. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566-67. But see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87
(1957) (holding a state has no need to prove exposure to obscene material would create a
clear and present danger of antisocial conduct or would probably induce recipients of that
material to engage in such conduct).
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ently contrary language by hinting that Roth would apply only to pub-
lic distribution of obscene materials. 2
Stanley's potential to expand First Amendment protection was
soon limited by United States v. Reidel. 3 In Reidel, the Court upheld
a conviction under federal obscenity laws even though the material
involved was distributed only to consenting adults.94 In reaffirming
Roth, the Court noted that Stanley "does not require that we fashion
or recognize a constitutional right ... to distribute or sell obscene
materials. 95 As characterized by Reidel, Stanley focused simply on
"freedom of mind and thought and on the privacy of one's home," and
that the right to receive material does not imply a right to transmit
such material.96
In 1973, Stanley was construed even more narrowly. In United
States v. Orito, the defendant was convicted of transporting obscene
materials via private carrier. 7 In rejecting Orito's contention that
transportation of the material via private carrier was protected under
Stanley if it was only meant for consenting adults, the Court held that
no "zone of constitutionally protected privacy follows such material
when it is moved outside the home area protected by Stanley. '98 As
recharacterized, Stanley's holding rests more upon privacy in the
home than upon the right to receive information.99 Thus, despite
Stanley's broad promise to protect citizens from government attempts
92. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567. The Court justified the Roth obscenity standard because
"there is always the danger that obscene material might fall into the hands of chil-
dren ... or that it might intrude upon the sensibilities or privacy of the general public." Id.
The first justification for Roth does not support the holding in Stanley, because privately
possessed obscene material could still fall into the hands of children. If the logic behind
the second justification was extended, it would foreclose prohibiting any speech where only
consenting adults might hear it, regardless of the location where the communication took
place.
93. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
94. Itt at 356-57.
95. Id at 356. The Court drew a distinction between private possession in the home
and regulation of external speech:
The personal constitutional rights of those like Stanley to possess and read ob-
scenity in their homes and their freedom of mind and thought do not depend on
whether the materials are obscene or whether obscenity is constitutionally pro-
tected. Their rights to have and view that material in private are independently
saved by the Constitution.
Id.
96. Id
97. 413 U.S. 139, 140 (1973).
98. Id at 141-42.
99. See id. at 142-43 (cataloging "special safeguards to the privacy of the home" pro-
vided by the Constitution); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126-27
(1973) (characterizing Stanley as resting upon an "explicitly narrow and precisely deline-
to regulate "moral" thoughts, subsequent cases effectively limit Stan-
ley to its facts.1' °
E. The Miller Test
In Miller v. California,01 the Court established the definition of
"obscenity" that is still used today. While the Miller Court maintained
the basic elements of the Roth-Memoirs test, some elements were
changed, with the result that materials could be more readily found
obscene:
A state [obscenity] offense must.., be limited to works which,
taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which,
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value. °2
First, the Court made it more difficult for a sexual work to
demonstrate sufficient "value" to merit First Amendment protection.
"Social value" is no longer sufficient; a work must instead fall within
the categories of "literary, artistic, political, or scientific" before it can
be considered valuable under the Miller obscenity test.103 In addition,
under the Memoirs standard, an allegedly obscene work receives First
Amendment protection unless it is "utterly" without social value."
After Miller, otherwise obscene material is protected under the First
Amendment only if it has "serious" value. 0 5 The Court made no at-
tempt to define the level of value required to be considered "serious."
Second, the Court mandated that in applying "community stan-
dards" to determine whether a work appealed to the prurient interest
or was patently offensive, local rather than national community stan-
dards could be used.0 6 Finding that national community standards
ated privacy right" and depending "not on any First Amendment right to purchase or pos-
sess obscene materials, but on the right to privacy in the home").
100. See, e.g., Reidel, 402 U.S. at 356 (holding the government can prohibit sale of ob-
scene material to consenting adults); 12 200-Ft Reels of Film, 413 U.S. at 128-30 (holding
state government can prohibit importation of obscene material even though it is only for
personal, private use); Orito, 413 U.S. at 143-45 (holding interstate transportation of ob-
scene material for private use of transporter or by private carriage can be prohibited);
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (holding that even private possession of child por-
nography in the home can be prohibited).
101. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
102. hm at 24.
103. 111
104. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion).
105. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25.
106. Id. at 31-32.
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are "unascertainable,"' 0 7 and that it is "neither realistic nor constitu-
tionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the peo-
ple of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found
tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City,'1 08 the Court opined that
"in terms of danger to free expression, the potential for suppression
seems at least as great in the application of a single nationwide stan-
dard as in allowing distribution in accordance with local tastes."'0 9 In
accordance with its endorsement of local standards, the Court upheld
a jury instruction which referred to "'contemporary community stan-
dards of the State of California."' °
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court affirmed and extended
its approval of local community standards for evaluating whether a
work is obscene. In Hamling v. United States,"' the Court held that a
statewide standard is not constitutionally required:
A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of
the average person in the community or vicinage from which he
comes for making the required determination, just as he is enti-
tled to draw on his knowledge of the propensities of a "reason-
able" person in other areas of the law."'
Thus, although a statewide community standard is constitution-
ally permissible, a smaller geographic area also could be used to de-
fine the relevant "community.""113 It is not necessary, however, to
define any specific geographic community from which the jury must
abstract a community standard." 4
107. Id at 31.
108. Id. at 32.
109. Id. at 32 n.13.
110. Id. at 31. Perhaps in an attempt to compensate for the indeterminacy of "local"
standards and the subjectivity involved in determining whether a work contains "serious"
value, the Miller Court also announced that "no one will be subject to prosecution for the
sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently
offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law." Id. at
27. The Court, however, has not actually required that obscenity statutes contain such
specificity. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 776 (1977) (finding an Illinois obscenity
statute was not overbroad when it failed to comply with Miller's requirement that it state
specifically the kinds of sexual conduct that could be declared obscene).
111. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
112. Id. at 104-05.
113. In Hamling, the Court hypothesized that the "community standard" most likely to
be used by the jury was the district from which the jurors were drawn. Id at 105-06.
114. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) ("We also agree with the Supreme
Court of Georgia's implicit approval of the trial court's instructions directing jurors to ap-
ply 'community standards' without specifying what 'community."').
Although the extent of protection given to a work by the First
Amendment is indisputably a legal question,"' the Court has allowed
juries to determine what appeals to prurient interest and what is pa-
tently offensive on the grounds that these are "essentially questions of
fact.""' The Court has used the factual nature of this determination
to limit the types of evidence that defendants may use to demonstrate
that their material is not obscene according to local standards. For
example, in Hamling the Supreme Court found that the trial judge
could exclude from evidence materials similar to those accused of be-
ing obscene: "[T]he availability of similar materials on the newsstands
of the community does not automatically make them admissible as
tending to prove the nonobscenity of the materials which the defend-
ant is charged with circulating.""' 7 The Court similarly has held that
materials, previously adjudicated as nonobscene, are not necessarily
relevant evidence as to the obscenity of the material before the
jury."' In addition, the fact that there is no crime of obscenity under
the laws of the community in which a federal prosecution has been
brought may be relevant evidence of community standards, but the
lack of a state obscenity law does not mean that all material is not
obscene under that state's community standards." 9 Finally, by mak-
ing these issues questions of fact, a finding of obscenity is largely insu-
lated from appellate review.'20
115. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,497 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[I]f obscenity is to be suppressed, the question whether a particu-
lar work is of that character involves not really an issue of fact but a question of constitu-
tional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind.").
116. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973); Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 159.
117. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 125 (1974). One might think that material
similar to that before the jury, for sale in the local community, and purchased by members
of that local community would always be relevant to determining the community's toler-
ance for sexual material. The Court held that "'[m]ere availability of similar material by
itself means nothing more than that other persons are engaged in similar activities."' Id. at
126 (quoting United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir. 1971)). The fundamen-
tal flaw in this reasoning is that evidence of the activities in which other persons in the
community are engaged is exactly the sort of evidence needed to determine the commu-
nity's tolerance for sexually oriented publications. The Court has not gone so far as to hold
that such evidence is never relevant. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 297 (1977)
(noting, without comment, that defendant introduced into evidence "numerous sexually
explicit materials that were available for purchase at 'adult' bookstores" in the area).
118. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 126-27.
119. Smith, 431 U.S. at 303-04.
120. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 124. The Court had to draw back from its hands-off position
somewhat in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). In that case, the Court's grant of
power to juries to determine what works of art are socially permissible led to the foresee-
able result that a nationally distributed, critically acclaimed film, Carnal Knowledge, was
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In 1989, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its use of local community
standards even for an inherently national or international medium of
communication. In Sable Communications v. FCC,121 the Court re-
fused to redefine the test for community standards to create a national
standard for dial-a-porn services. In the Court's view:
Sable is free to tailor its messages, on a selective basis, if it so
chooses, to the communities it chooses to serve. While Sable
may be forced to incur some costs in developing and implement-
ing a system for screening the locale of incoming calls, there is
no constitutional impediment to enacting a law which may im-
pose such costs on a medium electing to provide these
messages.122
The Court simply refused to consider the "costs" imposed upon
nonobscene speech, i.e., the costs imposed upon sexual telephone
communications in areas where such communication would not con-
travene community standards. 23 The difficulty in determining local
standards across a large number of localities and the resulting in-
creased cost of communicating were simply irrelevant to the Court's
calculus in allowing localities to brand speech obscene.
F. Justifying the Obscenity Exception
When the Court adopted the current obscenity test in Miller, the
justification asserted by the Court for allowing governmental regula-
tion of obscenity changed from a focus on preventing immoral acts to
the regulation of commerce. This change resulted, at least in part,
from Stanley's protection of individual private consumption of por-
nography and its rejection of government "mind control." In resting
the obscenity exception on a governmental interest in regulating com-
merce, however, the Court demonstrated the erroneous assumptions
underlying its obscenity jurisprudence.
In Roth, the Supreme Court found for the first time that obscene
speech is simply not protected by the First Amendment because ob-
scene speech contained no social value. 24 This lack of value, along
with a dubious historical argument, are the only grounds upon which
the obscenity exception is justified.'2 Prior to Roth, obscenity laws
found obscene under Georgia law. The Court then had to rely on its own viewing of the
film to hold the film not patently offensive. ld. at 161.
121. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
122. idt at 125.
123. See id.
124. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1957).
125. See infra notes 147-165 and accompanying text (discussing the failings of Roth's
historical argument).
had been used to prevent the spread of immoral thoughts and result-
ing immoral conduct.126 Under the logic of Roth and the Court's as-
sumption that the First Amendment protected only "valuable"
speech, it was simply irrelevant whether obscenity regulation was an
attempt to regulate the "morality" of a citizen's thoughts."2 7
The Court's protection of private possession of pornography in
Stanley undermined the traditional argument that obscenity regulation
is justified as moral thought control."2 In Stanley, the Court's state-
ment that "[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds"' 29 rejected the
argument that the government could regulate a citizen's thoughts.
Although Stanley's reach was severely limited by the 1973 Term's de-
cisions, the Court has avoided justifying the obscenity exception on a
state's right to control the thoughts of its citizenry.130
In its reaffirmation of obscenity regulation in Miller, the Supreme
Court articulated a new justification for the obscenity exception, with-
out explicitly acknowledging it had changed the obscenity exception's
justifications. Miller's expansion of obscene speech to that which does
not contain "serious" artistic, literary, scientific, or political value
made it possible to ban material containing social value.' 3' As a re-
sult, the Court could not rely on the justification that obscene speech
was regulable because it was utterly devoid of such value. 32 In addi-
tion, Stanley's broad pronouncements regarding freedom of thought
made it necessary for the Court to distinguish between protecting in-
dividuals from the harmful effects of pornography and the "mind con-
trol" prohibited in Stanley. 33
126. See supra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
127. For nonobscene speech, however, the Court found that even sexually related
speech could not be prohibited simply because of the ideas advocated by that speech. See
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) ("[The First
Amendment's] guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional
or shared by a majority .... And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is
eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.").
128. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 & n.8 (1960).
129. Id. at 565.
130. See infra notes 134-144 and accompanying text. The promotion of immoral
thoughts has not been sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to nonsexual speech.
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969); see also STROSSEN, supra note 12, at 40-
48.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 103-105.
132. This conundrum was what the Memoirs plurality sought to avoid when it adopted
the "utterly without redeeming social value" test. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413, 419-20 (1966) (plurality opinion).
133. See infra note 144.
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In Miller, the Court repeatedly referred to the commercial ex-
ploitation of sex.'3 Although the Court first referred to protecting
unwilling recipients or juveniles from offensive sexual material,135 its
holding is not limited to protecting these categories of persons. In-
stead, the Court focused on the commercial use of sexual material,
noting that "[s]ex and nudity may not be exploited without limit by
films or pictures exhibited or sold in places of public accommodation
any more than live sex and nudity can be exhibited or sold without
limit in such public places."' 36 The Court implied that, since only
"commercial" speech was at issue, obscenity regulation is constitu-
tional: "We do not see the harsh hand of censorship of ideas.., and
'repression' of political liberty lurking in every state regulation of
commercial exploitation of human interest in sex."'1 37 As a result of
this lessened protection, the Court concluded that "[o]bscene material
may be validly regulated by a State in the exercise of its traditional
local power to protect the general welfare of its population.' 3 8
On the same day as its decision in Miller, the Court also decided
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton. 39 In that case, the Court rested its
decision even more explicitly on the commercial nature of pornogra-
phy,14 ° justifying the regulation of commercialized obscenity by "the
interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community
environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, pos-
134. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25-26 (referring to "exhibition" and "sale" of
obscene materials), 35 (referring to "the public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for
its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial gain"), 35-36 (discussing "state regulation of
commercial exploitation of human interest in sex"), 36 (referring to "commercial exploita-
tion of obscene material") (1973).
135. Id. at 18-19 ("This Court has recognized that the States have a legitimate interest
in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemi-
nation carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipi-
ents or of exposure to juveniles.") (footnote omitted).
136. See id. at 25-26 (citations omitted).
137. ld. at 35-36.
138. Id- at 32-33 n.13.
139. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
140. See id at 57 (referring to "regulating the use of obscene material in local com-
merce"), 57-58 (finding legitimate state interests in "stemming the tide of commercialized
obscenity" and in preserving "the tone of commerce in the great city centers"), 61 (com-
paring the criminalization of obscenity to "much lawful state regulation of commercial and
business affairs"), 64 (comparing the criminalization of obscenity to state "blue sky" laws,
which "regulate what sellers of securities may write or publish about" their wares"), 68
(referring to "[c]ommercial exploitation of depictions ... of obscene conduct on commer-
cial premises"), 69 (referring to the states' "power to make a morally neutral judgment that
public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such material, has a tendency to
injure the community as a whole").
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sibly, the public safety itself." '141 Thus, "there are legitimate state in-
terests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity,
even assuming it is feasible to enforce effective safeguards against ex-
posure to juveniles and to passersby."'142 This reasoning is in line with
decisions that allow the commercial exploitation of pornography to be
considered as one factor in finding material obscene.143 Miller and
Paris Adult Theatre I justify regulation of obscene speech in its public
and commercial manifestations even though the obscenity exception
formulated in those cases applies equally to noncommercial and pri-
vate speech.144
As with its use of "local" community standards to determine
whether material is patently offensive or appeals to prurient interest,
the justifications asserted by the Court for excepting the "commercial
exploitation of sex" from First Amendment protection rest upon a
specific view of the nature of the "community" that must be protected
from sexual speech. The Court's emphasis on "the quality of life and
141. Id. at 58. The Court continued by citing the minority report from the 1970 pornog-
raphy commission, finding an "arguable correlation between obscene material and crime."
Id at 58 & n.8 (citation omitted). As a final justification, the Court pointed to the "'right
of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society."' Id at 59-60 (quoting
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
142. Id at 57-58.
143. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966) (holding that where the
purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of the publications, pander-
ing is relevant to determining obscenity); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 130-31
(1974). The Court has never held that noncommercial material cannot be obscene. In-
deed, such a holding would conflict with some of the cases which limited Stanley. See supra
note 36. The commercial nature of such material, however, is an important factor in the
Court's analysis. See, e.g., Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595,598 (1977) (noting that, when
determining if material has social importance, circumstances which indicate whether the
matter is being commercially exploited for its prurient appeal may be considered); FW/
PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 253 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that even if each book or film sold by a business might not be
considered obscene if viewed in isolation, cities could constitutionally prohibit businesses
which specialize in selling sexually oriented works).
144. The Court distinguished its justifications for prohibiting obscene films in a theater
from the holding in Stanley:
[W]e reject the claim that the State of Georgia is here attempting to control the
minds or thoughts of those who patronize theaters. Preventing unlimited display
or distribution of obscene material, which by definition lacks any serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value as communication is distinct from a control of
reason and the intellect .... Commercial exploitation of depictions, descriptions,
or exhibitions of obscene conduct on commercial premises open to the adult pub-
lic falls within a State's broad power to regulate commerce and protect the public
environment.... The States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment
that public exhibition of obscene material.., has a tendency to injure the com-
munity as a whole.
Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 67-69 (citation omitted).
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the total community environment" 14 5 and "the tone of commerce in
the great city centers"1" rests upon its view of the community as a
physically defined locality where "pornography" has a tangible, for-
bidden presence. The Court's paradigm of the "community" as a dis-
crete geographical area, however, underlies its use of "local"
community standards and fails when applied to computer networks.
HIL. The Scope of "Community" and Local Control
A. Justice Harlan's Incorporation Argument
Many of the reasons asserted to justify the use of local commu-
nity standards in obscenity prosecutions were articulated by Justice
John Marshall Harlan in the context of a debate over the extent to
which the First Amendment should be incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment. Justice Harlan argued that the First Amendment
should not be fully applied to the states, which should be given greater
latitude to regulate obscenity than the federal government.147 Justice
Harlan explicitly based his argument on a balance between the state's
interest in regulating morality and the individual's freedom of
speech.148
In Roth, the Supreme Court excluded "obscene" speech from
First Amendment protection on the grounds that "obscenity" had al-
ways been regulated by the states, and obscene speech had too little
"value" to merit First Amendment protection. 49 Roth's historical ar-
gument, however, ignores the fact that until the passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the First Amendment restrained only federal
power.' 50 Thus, a history of state regulation of obscenity is simply ir-
relevant to the question of the First Amendment's scope. 5' In addi-
tion, the holding that obscenity is "valueless" involves the Court in
145. Id. at 58.
146. Id
147. The more I see of these obscenity cases the more convinced I become that in
permitting the States wide, but not federally unrestricted, scope in this field, while
holding the Federal Government with a tight rein, lies the best promise for
achieving a sensible accommodation between the public interest sought to be
served by obscenity laws ... and protection of genuine rights of free expression.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203-04 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
148. Id; see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504-05 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
149. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 481-86.
150. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664-66 (1925).
151. It is true.., that obscenity laws appeared on the books of a handful of States
at the time the First Amendment was adopted. But the First Amendment was,
until the adoption of the Fourteenth, a restraint only upon federal power. More-
over, there is an absence of any federal cases or laws relative to obscenity in the
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judgments that the First Amendment seeks to prevent: "Neither rea-
son nor history warrants exclusion of any particular class of expression
from the protection of the First Amendment on nothing more than a
judgment that it is utterly without merit. ' 152 On these grounds, Jus-
tices William 0. Douglas and Hugo Black disagreed with the majority
in Roth, and argued that neither the states nor the federal government
have the power to prohibit obscene speech.153 This argument rests on
the belief that the First Amendment applies fully to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment.154
Like Justices Douglas and Black, Justice Harlan drew a distinc-
tion between the roles of the states and federal government at the
time of the Constitution's passage. Justice Harlan noted that "the in-
terests which obscenity statutes purportedly protect are primarily en-
trusted to the care, not of the Federal Government, but of the States.
Congress has no substantive power over sexual morality.' 1 55 Yet un-
like Justices Douglas and Black, Justice Harlan argued that the Four-
teenth Amendment should not impose the same restrictions upon the
state governments that the First Amendment imposes on the federal
government.156 In large part, Justice Harlan's argument is based upon
his view of the differing consequences of state and federal regulation
of speech.
Justice Harlan argued that the federal government should be
greatly restricted in any attempts to regulate obscene speech on the
grounds that "the dangers of federal censorship in this field are far
greater than anything the States may do."'15 7 He based his argument
on the effects that would follow from government suppression of sex-
ual speech:
[T]he dangers to free thought and expression are truly great if
the Federal Government imposes a blanket ban over the Nation
on... a book. The prerogative of the States to differ on their
ideas of morality will be destroyed, the ability of States to exper-
period immediately after the adoption of the First Amendment. Congress passed
no legislation relating to obscenity until the middle of the nineteenth century.
Memoirs v. Massachusets, 383 U.S. 413, 430 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring).
152. Id
153. Roth, 354 U.S. at 508 (Douglas, 3., dissenting).
154. See id; Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 430-31 (Douglas, J., concurring).
155. Roth, 354 U.S. at 504 (Harlan. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156. Id at 504-05.
157. Id. at 505. Although Justice Harlan's arguments support the conclusion that the
federal government should have no power to regulate obscenity, he argued that the gov-
ernment should be allowed to suppress "'hard-core pornography."' Memoirs, 383 U.S. at
457 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan, however, gave no justification for granting the
federal government the power to suppress such speech.
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iment will be stunted. The fact that the people of one State can-
not read some of the works of D.H. Lawrence seems to me, if
not wise or desirable, at least acceptable. But that no person in
the United States should be allowed to do so seems to me to be
intolerable, and violative of both the letter and spirit of the First
Amendment.15 8
In Justice Harlan's view, the federal government's ability to regu-
late sexual speech must be tightly restricted because a federal prohibi-
tion would have much greater scope than a prohibition in an
individual state.
On the same grounds, Justice Harlan would have left the states
free, within bounds, to "experiment" with restrictions on sexually re-
lated expression:
It has often been said that one of the great strengths of our fed-
eral system is that we have, in the forty-eight States, forty-eight
experimental social laboratories. ... And it seems to me that no
overwhelming danger to our freedom to experiment and to grat-
ify our tastes in literature is likely to result from the suppression
of a borderline book in one of the States, so long as there is no
uniform nation-wide suppression of the book, and so long as
other States are free to experiment with the same or bolder
books. 59
Thus, Justice Harlan relied heavily on the assumption that the
consequences of one state's suppression of sexual speech would be
small enough that no great harm to freedom of speech in general
could result from balancing the state's interest in the moral welfare of
its citizens against the right of individual citizens to engage in sexually
oriented speech. 160
As a result of his lessened concern with state regulation of sexual
speech, Justice Harlan's focus in reviewing a state obscenity prosecu-
tion was "whether the defendant was deprived of liberty without due
process of law.' 161 His sole inquiry was
whether the state action so subverts the fundamental liberties
implicit in the Due Process Clause that it cannot be sustained as
158. Roth, 354 U.S. at 506 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. Id. at 505-06; see also Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 460 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Others
will consider that the Court's present course unduly restricts state experimentation with
the still elusive problem of obscenity" and that "it is the part of wisdom... to leave room
for such experimentation, which indeed is the underlying genius of our federal system.").
160. "State obscenity laws present problems of quite a different order. The varying
conditions across the country, the range of views on the need and reasons for curbing
obscenity, and the traditions of local self-government in matters of public welfare all favor
a far more flexible attitude in defining the bounds for the States." Memoirs, 383 U.S. at
458 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
161. Roth, 354 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
a rational exercise of power.... The States' power to make
printed words criminal is, of course, confined by the Fourteenth
Amendment, but only insofar as such power is inconsistent with
our concepts of "ordered liberty."' 62
As a result, "the Fourteenth Amendment requires of a State only
that it apply criteria rationally related to the accepted notion of ob-
scenity and that it reach results not wholly out of step with current
American standards.' 63
Because of the lessened impact that he felt state regulation would
have on sexual speech in general, Justice Harlan required little in the
way of justification to regulate such speech. For example, he would
have allowed sexual speech to be prohibited on the grounds that it
might cause the hearer to engage in undesirable conduct.164  In
addition,
[o]ther interests within the proper cognizance of the States may
be protected by the prohibition placed on such materials. The
State can reasonably draw the inference that over a long period
of time the indiscriminate dissemination of materials, the essen-
tial character of which is to degrade sex, will have an eroding
effect on moral standards. And the State has a legitimate inter-
est in protecting the privacy of the home against invasion of un-
solicited obscenity. 1 on
Thus, under Justice Harlan's approach, the states would have
been given great latitude in regulating sexual speech.
B. Justifying "Local" Community Standards
The rationales asserted by the Court for allowing both state and
federal governments to prosecute obscenity cases under local commu-
nity standards follow Justice Harlan's arguments for giving the states
162. ld. at 501 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1947)).
163. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 458 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In accordance with this view,
Justice Harlan dissented in several decisions providing evidentiary or procedural protec-
tions to those accused of an obscenity offense. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 169-72
(1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (giving states great latitude in
defining obscenity offense and arguing that there is no requirement that expert testimony
regarding community standards must be admitted); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
76 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (dissenting from a decision imposing procedural require-
ments on a commission investigating the distribution of obscene material to minors).
164. Roth, 354 U.S. at 501-02 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[I]t is not irrational, in our present state of knowledge, to consider that pornography can
induce a type of sexual conduct which a State may deem obnoxious to the moral fabric of
society.").
165. Id. at 502.
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greater latitude under the Fourteenth Amendment.166 The local com-
munity standards rule has been justified on three grounds. First, the
Court has argued that "national" standards are too vague to ascer-
tain.167 Second, the Court has asserted that the use of local standards
is necessary to balance the state's interest in prohibiting obscenity
against the individual's right to speak. 68 Third, the use of local stan-
dards allegedly prevents the harm that may result from imposing a
uniform national standard on all localities. 6 9
By using its definition of obscenity as a factual inquiry, the Court
argues the impossibility of ascertaining national community standards.
For example, in Miller, the Court opined that "[n]othing in the First
Amendment requires that a jury must consider hypothetical and unas-
certainable 'national standards' when attempting to determine
whether certain materials are obscene as a matter of fact.' 170 The
supporters of "local" standards assert that it would be impossible to
prove the existence of a national standard,' 7 ' claiming that "our Na-
tion is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably
expect that such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a
single formulation, even assuming that the prerequisite consensus ex-
ists."' 72 This argument heavily relies upon the Court's decision that
"community standards" are a matter of fact rather than of constitu-
tional law:
When triers of fact are asked to decide whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would
consider certain materials "prurient," it would be unrealistic to
166. The similarities between Justice Harlan's position and the community standards
position adopted in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Miller adopting local community
standards have been noted. See Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524, 524 (1970) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Harlan, J.) ("I am not persuaded that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments necessarily prescribe a national and uniform measure-
rather than one capable of some flexibility and resting on concepts of reasonableness-of
what each of our several States constitutionally may do to regulate obscene products
within its borders."); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319, 319 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("In my view we should not inflexibly deny to each of the States the power to adopt and
enforce its own standards as to obscenity and pornographic materials; States ought to be
free to deal with varying conditions and problems in this area."); see also Walker v. Ohio,
398 U.S. 434, 434-35 (1970) (Burger, C.S., dissenting) (same grounds).
167. See infra text accompanying notes 170-174.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 175-178.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 179-180.
170. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31-32 (1973).
171. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("I be-
lieve that there is no provable 'national standard,' and perhaps there should be none. At
all events, this Court has not been able to enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to
expect local courts to divine one.").
172. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
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require that the answer be based on some abstract formula-
tion.... To require a State to structure obscenity proceedings
around evidence of a national "community standard" would be
an exercise in futility.'7 3
Thus, the Court's definition of obscenity allows it to avoid deter-
mining the national scope of the First Amendment. As a result,
although "[u]nder a National Constitution, fundamental First Amend-
ment limitations on the powers of the States do not vary from commu-
nity to community,... this does not mean that there are, or should or
can be, fixed, uniform national standards of precisely what appeals to
the 'prurient interest' or is 'patently offensive.""' 74
The Court's second justification for applying local community
standards rests upon its goal of seeking a balance between the com-
munity's interests in enforcing morality and an individual's right to
receive pornography. This assertion is closely related to Justice
Harlan's argument that states should be free to experiment with re-
strictions upon speech. In Jacobellis, Chief Justice Warren Burger
stated the issue as follows: "[W]e are called upon to reconcile the right
of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society and, on
the other hand, the right of individuals to express themselves freely in
accordance with the guaranties of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."' 175
To combat the individual right to "speak" or "hear" granted by
the First Amendment, the Court has relied upon a collective "right" to
maintain a "decent" society.1 76 The Court, therefore, has justified lo-
cal community standards in terms of the types of public speech people
173. Id. Indeed, the Court's willingness to accept widely divergent results in cases sup-
posedly determining the constitutional protection afforded speech under the First Amend-
ment comes, at least in part, from its definition of obscenity as a factual question rather
than a legal one: "The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate factfinders in
criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted triers of fact to draw on the standards of
their community, guided always by limiting instructions on the law." Id.
174. Id.
175. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 199 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger eventu-
ally won the day and authored Miller, where the Supreme Court definitively adopted his
"local" standards rule. See supra text accompanying notes 172-174.
176. It is said that such a "community" approach may well result in material being
proscribed as obscene in one community but not in another, and, in all
probability, that is true. But communities throughout the Nation are in fact di-
verse, and it must be remembered that, in cases such as this one, the Court is
confronted with the task of reconciling conflicting rights of the diverse communi-
ties within our society and of individuals.
Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200-01 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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in a locality must "accept."' 177 As a result of this localized right to
maintain a decent society, the First Amendment may protect material
in one community, but deny protection to that same material in
another. 178
The Court borrowed its third justification for using local commu-
nity standards from Justice Harlan's argument that the First Amend-
ment should impose severe restrictions upon the federal government.
In an attempt to balance the obvious chilling effect that results from
censoring material according to varying standards by community, sup-
porters of local community standards argue that use of such standards
actually provides greater protection for free speech:
The use of "national" standards, however, necessarily implies
that materials found tolerable in some places, but not under the
"national" criteria, will nevertheless be unavailable where they
are acceptable. Thus, in terms of danger to free expression, the
potential for suppression seems at least as great in the applica-
tion of a single nationwide standard as in allowing distribution
in accordance with local tastes, a point which Mr. Justice Harlan
often emphasized. 179
Under this view, local standards protect permissive communities
from the specter of "the absolutism of imposed uniformity.' ' 8 0
C. Local Standards and the Discrete Geographical Hamlet Fallacy
Each of these "justifications" for allowing jurors to rely on their
perception of "local community standards" is highly suspect, and each
rests upon a view of a "community" as a definable territory containing
a collection of relatively homogenous individuals with common inter-
ests in policing the sexual morality of the neighborhood. 8' This view
of the community is neither in accord with modem American life nor
the development of communications technology, and the resulting lo-
cal community standards rule rests upon two main fallacies. First, the
Court's assumption that communities are relatively homogenous re-
sults in the erroneous conclusion that "local" community standards
177. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 ("It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read
the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public
depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.").
178. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200-01 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("It is said that such a 'com-
munity' approach may well result in material being proscribed as obscene in one commu-
nity but not in another, and, in all probability, that is true. But communities throughout
the Nation are in fact diverse .... "); see Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
179. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 n.13.
180. Id. at 33.
181. This fictitious locale could be referred to as a "hamlet." See Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 143-45 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
are more easily definable than "national" ones. Second, by viewing
communities as discrete geographical areas, the Court ignores the ef-
fect obscenity regulation in one community has upon sexual speech
across a broad range of geographic regions. In the context of national
computer networks such as the Internet, the Court's model of the
community as a discrete, geographically defined locality will require
all of those communicating on such networks to gear their speech to
the most sensitive or puritanical locality.
D. The Homogenous Locality Assumption
The Court's argument that local standards should be used instead
of national standards presupposes that there is some definable "local
standard" of decency. This presupposition rests upon the assumption
that some geographical area exists within which the residents not only
share a common view of morality, but will also be aware of the moral
viewpoints held by their neighbors. As noted by Justice John Paul
Stevens, this "assumption can only relate to isolated communities
where jurors are well enough acquainted with members of their com-
munity to know their private tastes and values. The assumption does
not apply to most segments of our diverse, mobile, metropolitan
society.' ' 18
The revolution in communications technology makes the Court's
assumption untenable. The vastly increased amount of national and
international communication enables people across a wide range of
physical communities to develop and foster common interests. In the
absence of computers, telephones, fax machines, and high speed trans-
portation, it may be reasonable to assume that members of a local
community are subject to similar influences and viewpoints. With
rapid national communications, however, local communities can now
demonstrate the same diversity exhibited on a national scale.
In his dissenting opinion in Smith v. United States, Justice Stevens
noted the impossibility of defining a statewide community standard,
which would be permitted under Miller:
The most significant reasons for the failure to define a national
standard for obscenity apply with equal force to the use of local
standards.... The diversity within the Nation which makes a
single standard of offensiveness impossible to identify is also
present within each of the so-called local communities in which
litigation of this kind is prosecuted. Indeed, in Miller itself, thejury was asked to apply the contemporary community standard
182. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 314 n.10 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of California. A more culturally diverse State of the Union
hardly can exist, and yet its standard for judging obscenity was
assumed to be more readily ascertainable than a national
standard. 
1 3
As the variety of opinions and viewpoints within each locality in-
creases and importance of geography in defining one's interests de-
creases, a juror will be no more able to determine the "average" local
standard of decency than she would be able to determine a national
standard.'14
It is questionable whether the use of local community standards
was ever intended to accurately determine the average member of the
community's tolerance for explicit sexual expression. Public oppro-
brium surely prevents some of those who enjoy "pornographic" sexual
material from publicly expressing their enjoyment of such material.
Instead of ascertaining the average tastes of the community, jurors are
most likely to ascertain a sanitized public image of the community as
they believe it to exist, 8 5 or would like it to become. 8 6 In addition,
the Court has ignored differences in community tolerance of obscenity
when doing so has enhanced a government's ability to bring obscenity
prosecutions. For example, when upholding the federal government's
right to bring obscenity prosecutions for intrastate distribution of ob-
scene material in a state where such activity was not illegal, the Court
held that "the State's right to abolish all regulation of obscene mate-
rial does not create a correlative right to force the Federal Govern-
ment to allow the mails or the channels of interstate or foreign
commerce to be used for the purpose of sending obscene material into
the permissive state."18
183. Id. at 313-14.
184. Even if some geographic localities are sufficiently homogeneous to develop a prov-
able, nonarbitrary "community standard," the fact that some communities are more easily
offended than others does not justify a varying standard of First Amendment protection.
"Communities vary, however, in many respects other than their toleration of alleged ob-
scenity, and such variances have never been considered to require or justify a varying stan-
dard for application of the Federal Constitution." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194
(1964).
185. This result follows from the jury's inability to assess the "private tastes and values"
of everyone in the community. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 314 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
187. Smith, 431 U.S. at 307. Of course, since no materials were sent across state lines in
Smith, there was no issue of sending material "into" the state. The issue was the state's
tolerance of intrastate obscenity. Id. at 293-96. While the Court has cited Justice Harlan's
concern for diversity when allowing local communities to restrict obscenity, the Court ob-
viously has not shared Justice Harlan's concern that allowing expansive federal prosecution
would stifle that diversity. See United States v. Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13 (1973). In
Smith, the Court noted that
If the assumption that one's geographic locale determines one's
taste for erotic material is abandoned, "local" community standards
are no more ascertainable than "national" standards. In such an envi-
ronment, it is unlikely that juries would know the moral standards of
the "average" member of their community any better than they would
know the moral standards of the "average" citizen of the United
States. As geography plays a decreasing role in the formation of sex-
ual mores, there is little justification for assuming that citizens residing
within a geographically defined area will share identical views on sex-
ual morality. Therefore, the local community standards rule cannot
be supported on the grounds that local standards are more easily or
accurately ascertained than the standards of other forms of
''community."
E. The Discrete and Insular Community Assumption
The Court's local community standards rule further assumes that
these individual, discrete, geographically defined communities can
regulate offensive speech without serious repercussions for the consti-
tutionally protected sexual speech available within other communities.
Similar to the assumption that geographically defined communities
are homogeneous, the assumption ignores modem transportation and
communication. If the effects of the Court's "local standards" rule
were truly limited to the local community, obscenity regulation would
be little more than a zoning ordinance. After all, the members of one
geographically discrete community could obtain "obscene" material
simply by travelling to nearby geographical communities with less re-
strictive standards. 18 The use of local community standards to
criminalize speech in one community, however, also limits one's abil-
ity to speak outside of that local community.
Prohibition of "obscene" material according to indeterminate lo-
cality-based standards chills constitutionally protected speech in two
ways. First, the effect of declaring a work "obscene" in one locality
deters the speaker from exercising speech rights in other localities
[a]n even stronger reason for holding that a state law regulating distribution of
obscene material cannot define contemporary community standards in the case
before us is the simple fact that this is a federal prosecution.... The community
standards aspects of § 1461 ... present issues of federal law, upon which a state
statute such as Iowa's cannot have conclusive effect.
431 U.S. at 303-04.
188. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193-94 (1964) ("It can hardly be assumed that
all the patrons of a particular library, bookstand, or motion picture theater are residents of
the smallest local 'community' that can be drawn around that establishment.").
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where that speech would be protected by the First Amendment. As
noted by Justice William Brennan,
[t]o sustain the suppression of a particular book or film in one
locality would deter its dissemination in other localities where it
might be held not obscene, since sellers and exhibitors would be
reluctant to risk criminal conviction in testing the variation be-
tween the two places. It would be a hardy person who would
sell a book or exhibit a film anywhere in the land after this
Court had sustained the judgment of one "community" holding
it to be outside the constitutional protection. The result would
thus be "to restrict the public's access to forms of the printed
work which the State could not constitutionally suppress
directly."'18 9
In addition, when speech occurs simultaneously in many of these
"local" communities, the speaker must weigh the standards of all of
those communities in determining whether or not to speak. When one
considers the indeterminacy of local standards in a single community
and multiplies this indeterminacy by the large number of potential
"communities" into which nationally distributed speech may wander,
the impossibility of determining when such speech is "obscene" be-
comes apparent. Those who exercise their freedom of speech in mul-
tiple "local" geographical areas have two choices. They may limit the
communities where their speech travels, assuming that they would be
able to determine the "community standards" of some smaller
number of localities. 190 When this is not feasible, they must gear their
speech to meet the standards of the least tolerant community.191 This
189. Id. at 194 (quoting Smith, 361 U.S. at 154).
190. In Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989), the Court assumed
that this option was available for providers of sexual telephone services, although its opin-
ion reveals no consideration on the Court's part as to whether such a limitation was actu-
ally possible.
191. This was probably the only feasible alternative for Robert and Carleen Thomas,
who were convicted of 11 counts of transmitting obscenity over interstate phone lines.
United States v. Thomas, No. 94-20019 (W.D. Tenn. July 8, 1994); see Defining Obscenity in
Cyberspace: Calif. Couple Convicted on Memphis Standards, WASH. POST, Aug. 15,1994, at
18; Naaman Nickell, Obscenity Convictions Raise Fears on Bulletin Boards, ARiz. REPUB-
LIC, Aug. 8, 1994, at E3. The Thomases operated an adult, members-only Bulletin Board
System (BBS) in Milpitas, California; their BBS had about 3500 subscribers, who could
"chat" with other users on the BBS and make copies of more than 20,000 sexually oriented
pictures located on the BBS. See Gina Boubion, On-Line Pornography is Creating a Whole
New Set of Problems: Zoning Ordinances Cover Adult Bookstores, but What Do You Do
About Home Computers?, PmLA. INQUIRER, Mar. 12, 1994, at A4. The vast majority of
the pictures located on the BBS were not obscene. See id.
Obscenity charges were brought against the Thomases after a postal inspector, work-
ing with a U.S. Attorney, accessed the BBS from Tennessee. See Joanna H. Kim, Com-
ment, Cyber-Porn Obscenity: The Viability of Local Community Standards and the Federal
Venue Rules in the Computer Network Age, 15 Loy. L.A. ENrr. LJ. 415, 440 (1995); Mike
has "'the intolerable consequence of denying some sections of the
country access to material, there deemed acceptable, which in others
might be considered offensive to prevailing community standards of
decency.", , 19
Godwin, Virtual Community Standards, REASON, Nov. 1994, at 48. Of the 3500 subscribers
to the Thomases' BBS, only about five of those subscribers were from Tennessee. Kim,
supra, at 439 n.216. California officials had investigated the BBS, but had decided not to
charge the Thomases with any crimes. See Defining Obscenity in Cyberspace, supra, at 18.
In an unsuccessful motion to transfer the venue to California, the Thomases argued that
the prosecuturs shopped for a forum with a particularly conservative jury. See Kim, supra,
at 440; 2 Convicted in Computer Pornography Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1994, at B7; see
also Cyberporn Challenge in South: Moral Stop Sign Sought by U.S. on Info Highway, CH.
TRIB., July 21, 1994, at 4 (noting Memphis prosecutors "have a history of attacking what
they consider obscene").
There is little that the Thomases could have done to prevent such a conviction, short
of sanitizing their California BBS to comport with the "community standards" of Mem-
phis, Tennessee or other even more conservative jurisdictions. There is no way for the
Thomases to accurately identify the location of each of their callers, as anyone with access
to a long distance carrier can call the BBS. In practice, it is also impossible for the
Thomases to discern the local community standards in each of these localities across the
country. The Thomases' only option was to "sanitize" the BBS so that it comports with the
community standards of the most conceivably conservative locality in the United States, or
take the risk that prosecutors in conservative localities will cull through the more than
20,000 pictures on the BBS, looking for one that could be found patently offensive in their
jurisdiction.
192. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 193 (Brennan, J.) (quoting Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S.
478, 488 (1961)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has upheld the
Thomases' convictions. United States v. Thomas, Nos. 94-6648/94-6649, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1069 (6th Cir. January 29, 1996), reh'g denied, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4529 (6th Cir.
Mar. 12, 1996) (en banc). The court sidestepped the Thomases' argument that a different
definition of "community" should be applied in obscenity prosecutions involving com-
puters. 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1069, at *24-*26. It held that "this is not a situation where
the bulletin board operator had no knowledge or control over the jurisdictions where
materials were distributed for downloading or printing." Id. at *25. Since the Thomases
obtained a name and address from every user of their bulletin board, "[d]efendants had in
place methods to limit user access in jurisdictions where the risk of a finding of obscenity
was greater than that in California." Id. The court analogized to the providers of sexual
telephone messages in Sable, 492 U.S. at 125-26, and held that "there is no need for this
court to adopt a new defintion of 'community' for use in obscenity prosecutions involving
electronic bulletin boards." Thomas, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1069, at *25.
As in Sable, the Sixth Circuit's ruling assumes that the Thomases could have deter-
mined what obscenity standards might apply in all of the various localities from which
people called their BBS. The decision fails to consider the costs imposed by its require-
ment that a BBS operator continuously re-evaluate which material on the BBS could be
considered "obscene" in each locality from which a user could potentially gain access to
that material. The Sixth Circuit also failed to address the question of how the Thomases
could accurately determine the localities from which the users accessed the BBS. It is an
open question whether the Thomases could have been prosecuted in Tennessee if the in-
spectors had lied about their location when they applied for membership on the Thomases'
BBS.
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The venue rules for federal obscenity prosecutions illustrate how
the use of "local" standards in one area limits constitutionally pro-
tected speech in other areas. 93 Under those rules, one can be prose-
cuted for disseminating "obscene" material in any federal district
where obscenity is transmitted, received, or passes through while en
route to its destination. 194 As a result, "the guilt or innocence of dis-
tributors of identical materials mailed from the same locale can now
turn on the chancy course of transit or place of delivery of the materi-
als,"'195 and
[n]ational distributors choosing to send their products in inter-
state travels will be forced to cope with the community stan-
dards of every hamlet into which their goods may wander.
Because these variegated standards are impossible to discern,
national distributors, fearful of risking the expense and difficulty
of defending against prosecution in any of several remote com-
munities, must inevitably be led to retreat to debilitating self-
censorship that abridges the First Amendment rights of the
people.96
The end result is that communities where the First Amendment
grants protection to sexual speech must suffer from the intolerance of
other communities, and the more tolerant citizens are "'protected' far
beyond government's constitutional power to deny them access to sex-
ually oriented materials."'197
The chilling effect of "local" community standards upon speech
that is otherwise protected by the First Amendment is enhanced by
the manipulability of the size of the "locality" used to determine the
local standard. 9 The Court has noted that "[i]f a State wished to
193. Kim, supra note 191, at 431-34 (discussing the federal venue rules and their misap-
plication to computer bulletin board systems); see also supra note 191 (discussing
Thomases' prosecution).
194. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106-07 (1974).
The 1958 Amendments to 1461 constituted the mailing of obscene matter a con-
tinuing offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3237. The practical effect of this amendment-
intentionally adopted by Congress for that express purpose-is to permit prose-
cution "in the Federal district in which [the disseminator] mailed the obscenity, in
the Federal district in which the obscenity was received, or in any Federal district
through which the obscenity passed while it was on its route through the mails."
Id. at 143-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote and citations omitted).
195. Id at 144.
196. Id
197. lId at 144-45. "A construction that has such consequences necessarily renders the
constitutionality of [the federal venue rule] facially suspect under the First Amendment."
Id at 145.
198. This is similar to the effect that the federal venue rules introduce. The venue rules
allow for an expansion in the number of localities in which suits can be brought, and there-
fore an increase in uncertainty as to what standards will be applied. The manipulability of
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adopt a slightly different approach to obscenity regulation, it might
impose a geographic limit on the determination of community stan-
dards by defining the area from which the jury could be selected in an
obscenity case." 199 States have "considerable latitude" in determining
the size of the locality.200 "A State may choose to define an obscenity
offense in terms of 'contemporary community standards' as defined in
Miller without further specification..., or it may choose to define the
standards in more precise geographic terms .... ,201 Thus, not only
must one who distributes sexual material across more than one local-
ity contend with the indeterminacy of standards in each community,
the distributor must also contend with "communities" that vary in size
from one state to the next, or which are simply not defined. As a
result, "the geographic boundaries of the relevant community are not
easily defined, and sometimes appear to be subject to elastic adjust-
ment to suit the needs of the prosecutor. '20 2
The Court has demonstrated no inclination to reconsider its ap-
proach in light of modem technology. In Sable, the Court dismissed
the chilling effects of its local-standards rule, assuming that use of lo-
cal community standards to judge the obscenity of sexual telephone
services would merely force service providers to "incur some costs in
developing and implementing a system for screening the locale of in-
coming calls. 20 3 In dismissing these effects as simply "incurring
costs," the Court demonstrated an unwillingness either to consider
those costs when balancing the right to speak against societal interests
in regulating morality or to consider how those costs would inhibit
constitutionally protected speech in other localities.
the geographic size of the "locality" similarly increases uncertainty by introducing a
number of different potential geographic localities which may be used to judge a work's
obscenity. The consequences of manipulation of the venue rules are apparent in the
Thomas prosecution. See supra note 191.
199. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 303 (1977).
200. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974).
201. Id.
202. Smith, 431 U.S. at 314-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[A]Ithough a substantial body of evidence and decisional 1a4v concerning the con-
tent of a national standard could have evolved through its consistent use, the
derivation of the relevant community standard for each of our countless commu-
nities is necessarily dependent on the perceptions of the individuals who happen
to compose the jury in a given case.
Id.
Such manipulation is not unlike forum shopping for a conservative locality, as in the
Thomas prosecution. See supra note 191.
203. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989).
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F. Computer Networks and Local Standards
The Court's view of the "local" community as a geographically
defined, homogeneous, and discrete locality was problematic when
applied to our diverse modem society before the advent of the com-
puter. With the communication capabilities provided by modem com-
munications networks such as the Internet, the Court's approach has
become wholly unrealistic. The widespread use of computer networks
will increase the diversity of ideas in local communities, undermining
the assumption that there is. an ascertainable local standard of "de-
cency." For individual speakers, the indeterminacy of these local stan-
dards, in combination with the impossibility of controlling the
geographic locations in which one's speech is perceived, forces all
speakers to gear their speech to the most sensitive community. For
those providing network services, even if a service provider could de-
termine the local community standards in every geographic locality, it
would still be impossible to determine the geographic locality of eve-
ryone who accesses one's network services or to filter the vast amount
of information travelling across such networks according to standards
dependent upon the origin and destination of each bit of information.
1. The Decreased Homogeneity of Local Communities
With the increased ease of communication between individuals in
disparate geographic localities, computer networks undermine the as-
sumption that standards based upon geographically defined "local"
communities are more ascertainable than alternative formulations of
"community" standards. As the means of communication available
via computer networks become more and more sophisticated, physical
proximity will have a correspondingly decreased influence on commu-
nication. The dramatic increase in the amount of communication tak-
ing place on computer networks will increase the variety of individual
tolerance for sexual speech within local, geographically defined
communities.
While sexual material has been available through communica-
tions channels such as nonelectronic mail or the telephone for some
time, computer networks offer the first opportunity for groups of like-
minded individuals to communicate with each other on topics of their
own choosing in a manner similar to discussion between persons in
physical proximity. Internet newsgroups or electronic mailing lists of-
fer the opportunity for extended discussion on any topic with any
number of individuals.2°4 As computer networks develop greater ca-
pabilities, the range of communication available via computer net-
works is likely to equal or surpass the range of communication
available to people in physical proximity to each other.20 5 The in-
creasingly rich set of communications options available over computer
networks can only increase the influence that communication with
persons scattered across a wide range of geographical areas will have
upon an individual's opinions.
In addition, computer networks facilitate the formation of such
groups of individuals in a manner previously impossible. Unlike pre-
viously existing means of communicating across long distances, the
computer network itself provides the means by which one can find
other individuals who wish to communicate on a certain topic or in a
certain way. Anyone on the Internet can find out which Internet
newsgroups or electronic mailing lists cater to particular topics.206 It is
similarly easy to find the location of and means of accessing computer
archives.20 7 There is no need to physically locate one's companions to
"find" them or sexual material created by them on a computer
network.
Finally, the use of a computer network to communicate provides
one with anonymity that is unavailable to those seeking sexual materi-
als in a physical community.208 Computer users are free to define the
persona that they wish to project in their communications independ-
ent of any constraints imposed by their physical community. As a re-
sult, there may be no relationship whatsoever between the public
image projected by members of a physical community and their inter-
actions over a computer network.
While at one time those in a small community would have been
limited to the cultural outlook of those in the same locality, the in-
creased use of communications networks reveals this as no longer
true. The Internet and its subsidiary networks make a vast amount of
information equally available regardless of physical locality, and pro-
vide the ability to contact enormous numbers of people across the
globe without regard for geography. As the use of such networks in-
creases, locality will have an increasingly small effect on individuals'
204. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
205. See GMSTER, supra note 1, at 482-83 (discussing new developments, such as audio
and video transmission over the Internet).
206. See id. at 248-49.
207. See iU. at 242-57 (discussing means of finding specific information on the Internet).
208. See Kim, supra note 191, at 421 ("Cyberspace pornography may be preferable to
traditional methods of accessing pornography because of the anonymity it provides.").
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personal and professional lives.20 9 On a personal level, those with
particular interests, tastes, or talents will discover that they are not
alone.210 As individuals have more choices and greater opportunity to
develop their own tastes, tolerance for sexual expression can only be-
come increasingly varied among the members of local geographical
communities.2 1 As a result, the "local" standard for obscenity will
become increasingly meaningless and arbitrary.
2. "Tailoring" Speech by Locality is Impossible
The use of local standards forces those communicating via na-
tional communications media to exercise one of two options. First,
they may be able to limit their speech so that it is only accessible to
those in specific localities. Alternatively, they must gear their speech
to the most sensitive community in which that speech might be per-
ceived. For those speaking on computer networks or operating com-
puter systems that transmit the speech passing over such networks, it
will be impossible to place geographic limitations upon the dissemina-
tion of their speech. As a result, the local community standards rule
forces speakers on such networks to gear their speech to the most
sensitive community. Because of the indeterminacy of "local" stan-
dards, however, speakers on such networks or the providers of net-
work services will be unable to make a fine-grained determination as
to whether each item passing over the network comports with the
strictest local standard. Instead, speakers and service providers will
be forced to limit speech according to arbitrary and overbroad criteria
that will limit much constitutionally protected speech in addition to
"obscene" speech.
209. This is one of the central points made in books advocating the use of the Internet
for commercial purposes. See generally CRONIN, supra note 4.
210. For instance, there are Internet newsgroups devoted to topics such as homosexual-
ity and other minority sexual practices, particular religious beliefs, or survivors of trauma
such as child abuse. See CompuServe Restores Newsgroup Access, CoMPUTERwoRLD, Feb.
19, 1996, at 8. In a physically defined community, an individual may have trouble finding
others sharing the same interest in any of these areas. The Internet, however, provides a
much larger pool of people with which to find common interests. Obscenity regulation,
moreover, cannot alter the Internet's ability to bring together people with unusual sexual
interests. The First Amendment protects the discussion of ideas and no entire topic of
conversation can be prohibited. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1974) ("Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.").
211. See Olga Popov, Note, Towards a Theory of Underclass Review, 43 STAN. L. RPav.
1095, 1128 & nn.115-17 (1991).
In Sable, the Court found that providers of sexual telephone serv-
ices are "free to tailor [their] messages, on a selective basis.., to the
communities [they] choose[] to serve. ' 212 Arguably, providers of na-
tional telephone services cannot possibly determine the community
standards in every locality in the nation. Dial-a-porn providers, more-
over, have at least two capabilities that providers of computer net-
work services do not. First, they have a limited set of messages that
can be "tailored" to specific environments. Second, they have some
control over the localities to which these "tailored" messages are sent.
For the providers of computer network services, such "tailoring" will
be simply impossible.
In contrast with sexual telephone services, a vast amount of
speech generated by thousands of different individuals passes across
the Internet in the form of electronic mail, "news," files, and other
network services. 213 Communications take place between individuals,
among groups, in public discussions, or as anonymous file transfers to
or from an archive site.214 Computer systems on the Internet will not
only be the source or destination system for such traffic, but will also
route traffic from other systems destined for still more systems on the
network or other networks.215
The operator or owner of an individual computer system or net-
work on the Internet will obviously be unable to monitor the contents
of the electronic mail or electronic-mail-based discussion lists sent
from or to the individual user. The same problem arises with public
discussion fora such as newsgroups. The number of these fora, and
the quantity of material that passes through them, make it impossible
to view each article received by or sent from a computer as "news."
Given the vague and variegated standards provided by an obscenity
test dependent upon a subjective determination of "local community
standards," there is no conceivable way to filter all this information
and make a fine-grained determination of the constitutional protec-
tion given to each message based upon its source and destination
addresses.
Although the problem arises to a lesser degree with files stored in
computer archives, it will be difficult or impossible for many networks
even to fiter archived data according to "local community standards."
The owner or manager of a single, small computer system may be able
212. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989).
213. See supra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
214. I&
215. See KEHOE, supra note 27, at 8-11 (discussing electronic mail routes).
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to examine material stored on that computer. For a large database or
archive site on a busy network, to and from which files are continu-
ously transferred, however, it is unrealistic to suppose that a system
operator could make a determination of the constitutional protection
afforded to each file under the community standards of both the per-
son who places the file in the archive and the persons copying it.
3. Limiting Speech to Specific Geographic Localities is Impossible
Even assuming that community standards were ascertainable in
every locality in the United States, and that system managers and
users could determine whether individual electronic transmissions
were constitutionally protected under those standards, it would still be
difficult or impossible to determine which community's standards ap-
ply to a given transmission. Unlike nonelectronic mail or the physical
distribution of standard commercial pornography, messages from and
to individual users on computer networks are not fixed to an easily
ascertainable, geographically related address. In addition, the nature
of modern telecommunications makes it increasingly untenable to at-
tempt to distinguish between people based upon their geographic
location.
The individual "speaker" on the Internet has no means of deter-
mining where the "listeners" are located. For users speaking in new-
sgroups, there is no way for either the system manager or user
submitting an article to a newsgroup to determine where the message
will be read. Computer system managers or owners determine which
newsgroups their systems will carry and propagate to other systems.216
As a result, the individual user has no control over the physical locali-
ties into which the speech may wander. In fact, the only reasonable
assumption is that a news article will be read everywhere.
Even for nonpublic speech such as electronic mail, the individual
user cannot control the physical locality in which the speech may be
heard, or the localities through which the speech will pass on its way
to the listener. Even if the user knows the location of the computer to
which such communications are sent, the user has no control over the
locality from which the hearer would access that computer. Again,
the only reasonable assumption is that such speech may either be
heard in, or pass through, any possible geographic location.
System operators and users have no means of determining the
physical locality of other people on the Internet. Utilities such as the
216. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
remote login feature allow users to use remote computers across the
network.11 7 Through the use of a remote login or an anonymous auto-
mated network server, a user calling from one locality can either
transfer and receive messages anonymously or appear to be operating
from a choice of different systems. A simple example will demon-
strate the dilemma:
From home, a user in a small town in Virginia calls a computer
at the University of Maryland in Baltimore. The user then re-
motely logs in from the Maryland computer to a computer in
California. From the perspective of the computer operator in
California, there is no way of determining the user's locality.
The user could be sitting at a terminal in downtown Baltimore
or placing an international telephone call from Botswana.
Either way, once on the Maryland computer, all of the In-
ternet's information-transfer tools are available.
Of course, with the advent of mobile telephony, the problem be-
comes even more complicated. It would make no sense to treat the
user differently if the account is accessed while on a visit to Washing-
ton, D.C. than if at home in Virginia. Yet, under the logic of "local
community standards," any constitutional protection afforded to in-
formation transmitted or received by the user must depend upon the
user's locality at the time of the transfer.21
The indeterminacy of the "local" standard for any given commu-
nity, the impossibility of determining such standards for the vast range
of communities across the United States, and the impossibility of de-
termining the geographic source or destination of much of the mate-
rial passing over computer networks make it impossible for either
users or information service providers to determine what level of con-
stitutional protection is granted to sexual speech. In addition, the se-
vere penalties imposed for obscenity violations2 19 make it likely that
service providers will be afraid to flirt with an obscenity prosecution.
In this environment, factors such as artistic, literary, or political
value-considerations that grant constitutional protection to even the
most offensive work-will be subordinated to a mechanical calcula-
tion of the number of sexual references or a bald judgment as to
217. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
218. Even more absurd examples can be constructed. Assume that the user is traveling
from Virginia, through Washington, D.C., to a small town on Maryland's eastern shore.
Surely, information providers cannot be not expected to discern the constitutional protec-
tion afforded to the user traveling through these varied localities.
219. See .Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 61 (1989) (allowing the use of
RICO laws and their massive penalties in obscenity prosecutions).
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whether or not a communication deals with "safe" subject matter. 0
Even without self-censorship by service providers, individual users
who have no control over the eventual destination of messages must
constantly determine how their work might be viewed in every con-
ceivable locality. In this environment, the obscenity test formulated
by the Court reaches far beyond the offensive "low-value" speech that
the Court believes can justifiably be prohibited.
4. Justice Harlan Revisited
In the context of computer networks, the "local" community
standards rule is unable to actually give local communities the ability
to "balance" community interests against the right of free speech.
With networks such as the Internet, it is impossible to discriminate
between communities when providing network services. Since a user
cannot choose not to communicate with a given community, all com-
munities will be denied the opportunity to hear sexual speech because
the morals of the strictest conceivable community will control the
level of discussion. In this environment, neither Justice Harlan's in-
corporation argument nor the local community standards argument
are justifiable. The consequences of local regulation of obscenity are
the same as the consequences of national regulation of obscenity: eve-
ryone must gear their speech towards the most sensitive community.
Justice Harlan's argument for increased state control of obscenity has
now been turned on its head. The use of local standards to define
obscenity rests upon the premise that "no overwhelming danger to
our freedom to experiment and to gratify our tastes in literature is
likely to result from the suppression of a borderline book in one of the
States, so long as there is no uniform nation-wide suppression of the
book."' This is no longer true; the use of local community standards
220. This was the approach taken by Carnegie-Mellon University, when it decided to
remove all sexually oriented newsgroups containing "binaries" (files that can be decoded
and converted into pictures). Jeffrey E. Faulette, Note, The Freedom of Speech at Risk in
Cyberspace: Obscenity Doctrine and a Frightened University's Censorship of Sex on the
Internet, 44 DuIK L.J. 1155, 1164-65 (1995). As one commentator noted, "[tihe news-
groups contain a tremendous amount of information, both text and [encoded] images, in-
cluding some very hard-core pornography .... But removing these potentially illegal
images ... also requires removing a great deal of traditionally protected speech.... CMU
... chose to try to solve the dilemma by censoring altogether the sexually oriented binaries
newsgroups." Id. The vast majority of the material in these newsgroups consists of discus-
sion of photographs and "cheesecake" pictures, such as those available in Playboy, which
could not be considered legally obscene under any standard. See id.
221. United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476, 506 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
no longer protects obscenity regulation from "the absolutism of im-
posed uniformity."'
IV. An Alternative Approach
A. "National" Standards Are No Solution
Modem communications networks vividly illustrate the problems
inherent in the Court's adoption of local community standards as the
benchmark against which the constitutional protection for sexually re-
lated speech must be measured. Simply changing the "local" stan-
dards test to a "national" standards test, however, will not solve the
problems of indeterminacy, subjectivity, and excessive chilling of con-
stitutionally protected speech. Under either standard, the variations
in "community standards" from locality to locality will be impossible
to determine.
Because "community standards" are a factual issue left to the dis-
cretion of the jury, the community standards adopted by any single
jury will be heavily dependent upon the individual experiences of
those jurors. Even though "contemporary community standards take
on meaning only when they are considered with reference to the un-
derlying questions of fact that must be resolved in an obscenity
case," the Court has argued that the use of community standards
does not allow jurors to base judgments on their own opinions. In the
Court's view, "a principal concern in requiring that a judgment be
made on the basis of 'contemporary community standards' is to assure
that the material is judged neither on the basis of each juror's personal
opinion, nor by its effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive per-
son or group. '2 4 The Court, however, has repeatedly acknowledged
both the subjectivity and the indeterminacy of this standard. 2 5
The central problem with the "community standards" approach is
that there is no appropriately discernable community standard. The
222. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973).
223. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300 (1977) (footnote omitted).
224. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974) (citations omitted).
225. See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1978) ("Cautionary instructions
to avoid subjective personal and private views in determining community standards can do
no more than tell the individual juror that in evaluating the hypothetical 'average person'
he is to determine the collective view of the community, as best as it can be done."); Smith,
431 U.S. at 302 ("It would be just as inappropriate for a legislature to attempt to freeze a
jury to one definition of reasonableness as it would be for a legislature to try to define the
contemporary community standard of appeal to prurient interest or patent offensiveness, if
it were even possible for such a definition to be formulated.") (emphasis added); Kois v.
Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 232 (1972) (per curiam) ("[T]here is an undeniably subjective
element in the [community standards] test as a whole.").
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obscenity test is inherently subjective because, like any "reasonable-
ness" determination, jurors will import their own standards into the
determination rather than use an "objective" standard. In formulat-
ing the "community standards test," the Court noted the connection
between "community standards" and a "reasonableness" inquiry:
A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of
the average person in the community or vicinage from which he
comes for making the required determination, just as he is enti-
tled to draw on his knowledge of the propensities of a "reason-
able" person in other areas of the law.22
As the Court noted in Pinkus v. United States, however,
[e]very man is likely to think of himself as the happy exemplifi-
cation of "the reasonable man"; and so the standard he adopts
in order to fulfill the law's prescription will resemble himself, or
what he thinks he is, or what he thinks he should be, even if he is
not.227
Simply replacing the word "local" in the Miller definition of ob-
scenity with the word "national" cannot reduce the obscenity test's
chilling effect, because those speaking on national or international
computer networks will still be unable to predict how every jury in
every community will view the "national" decency standard. Perhaps
in tacit acknowledgement of the impossibility of defining a predictable
and logically supportable obscenity standard, the Court has abdicated
the final definition of "obscenity" to the jury.22 As Justice Stevens
has noted, however, the fact that the Court cannot describe "obscen-
ity," and therefore cannot give notice of what speech may be prohib-
ited, is no justification for leaving the issue to the vagaries of
individual juries:
The conclusion that a uniformly administered national standard
is incapable of definition or administration is an insufficient rea-
son for authorizing the federal courts to engage in ad hoc adju-
dication of criminal cases. Quite the contrary, it is a reason for
questioning the suitability of criminal prosecution as the mecha-
nism for regulating the distribution of erotic material. 29
226. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104-05.
227. 436 U.S. at 301 (quoting Simon E. Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From
McNaghten to Durham, and Beyond, 41 A.B.A. J. 793, 796 (1955)).
228. Smith, 431 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even the most articulate crafts-
man finds it easier to rely on subjective reaction rather than concrete descriptive criteria as
a primary definitional source.").
229. Id. Justice Harlan also noted the same point. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413, 460 (1966) (Harlan J., dissenting) ("Short of saying that no material relating to
sex may be banned, or that all of it may be, I do not see how this Court can escape the task
of reviewing obscenity decisions on a case-by-case basis."); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 708 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) ("Nor
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Even under a hypothetical "national" standard, those communi-
cating on computer networks must filter their speech according to
their best guess as to the possible views of a national standard by dif-
fering juries. Even if a national standard of decency is used, informa-
tion service providers will most likely feel safe only when using an
arbitrary and overly expansive test for determining whether material
could potentially be obscene anywhere in the country. Any test that
would be practicable in safeguarding the service provider or speaker
from an obscenity prosecution in every locality would necessarily chill
constitutionally protected sexual discussion by its overbreadth.23 °
B. The Redefinition of Comnunity
The Court's rejection of a uniform, national standard of decency
was correct. The Court's error lies in its assumption that there is some
way for discrete geographically based localities to regulate speech
without chilling constitutionally protected speech elsewhere. The
Court's model of geographically defined and discrete local communi-
ties appears grotesquely archaic in light of modem communications.
In fact, modem communications networks should lead to a redefini-
tion of how we view "communities."
While the Court has always defined "community" in geographic
terms, discussion groups, electronic mail, and real-time communica-
tions on modem information services provide, for the first time, the
potential to create "virtual" communities. People can, and do, spend
more time in communication with individuals in remote locations
across the globe than with the people who live in geographic proxim-
ity.23' As a matter of self-identification, the different groups of people
can I see, short of holding that all state censorship laws are constitutionally impermissible,
a course from which the Court is carefully abstaining, how the Court can hope ultimately
to spare itself the necessity for individualized adjudication.")
230. A statute is overbroad when it seeks to regulate conduct or speech not protected
by the First Amendment, but would also incidentally prohibit or "chill" expression that is
protected:
An overbroad statute-a statute that is written too broadly, or more broadly than
necessary-is one that is designed to burden or punish activities that are not con-
stitutionally protected, but its flaw is that, as drafted, it also includes activities
protected by the First Amendment. In the case of a statute that is overbroad on
its face, a carefully drawn statute could have reached the conduct. Nevertheless
the Court will strike the overbroad statute because it might apply to others, not
before the Court, who may engage in protected speech or activity that the statute
appears to outlaw.
JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.8, at 996 (5th ed.
1995).
231. See Betty J. Turock, The Big Chill on the Internet, Ciii. TRm., Apr. 11, 1996, at
N29.
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sharing common interests and problems on computer networks form a
community in a very real sense.
As communications networks become even more pervasive and
local geographical communities become even more tightly integrated
with the communications "web," individuals within the same geo-
graphical community will in reality participate in vastly different vir-
tual communities. Local regulations designed to control the moral
content of a citizen's thoughts will be oppressive in application and
ineffective in result once it becomes impossible to exclude anyone
from the wealth of information and the diversity of human experience
available across the communications web.
The geographic definition of "community" may make sense when
regulating physical institutions such as x-rated movie theaters or adult
book stores. Certainly, the "total community environment" and "tone
of commerce" of the geographic community is directly affected by the
exterior manifestations of such physical institutions. 32 One can also
argue that the geographically defined community is affected by the
consenting adults who make use of such sexually oriented businesses
to the extent of crowd-control and other concerns usually addressed
by zoning laws.2 33 This same regulatory approach, however, makes no
sense when applied to sexual material obtained by an individual in the
privacy of the home from a location with no relationship to the local
community. Sexual material transmitted directly into the home from
distant localities via national computer network simply does not affect
the "tone of commerce" in the local community.
While one may argue that the physical community is indirectly
affected by an individual's communications on an electronic communi-
cations network, this argument must rest entirely upon how an indi-
vidual's actions differ as a result of hearing sexually related speech
that would be offensive to others in the community. Three problems
arise when one attempts to justify regulating speech on communica-
tions networks because of subsequent actions of individuals who may
hear such speech. First, the effect of pornography upon the individual
does not comprise a particularly strong justification for prohibiting
speech, because as the Court noted in Stanley, "in the context of pri-
vate consumption of ideas and information we should adhere to the
view that '1a]mong free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to
232. See supra text accompanying notes 134-144 (discussing the Court's reliance on the
"tone of commerce" as a justification for obscenity regulation).
233. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976).
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prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of thelaw.,,,234
Second, whatever the merits to the argument that exposure to
sexual speech inevitably leads to unacceptable conduct, the "inherent
harm" in pornography obviously does not support the obscenity stan-
dard as currently formulated. If sexually related speech by itself is
inherently and provably harmful, the local standards rule in fact has
the effect of requiring governments in permissive localities to bear the
harmful effects of pornography, while those in less permissive locali-
ties can safely eliminate such harmful material. The Court has been
careful to avoid relying on the inherent "harm" of sexual speech, and
instead has based its test on local community control over such
speech. This local control, however, creates an environment where
much constitutionally protected sexual speech on computer networks
will be silenced.
Finally, an argument resting solely upon the effect of sexual
speech on the individual is similar to arguments that have been re-
jected by the Court when the government attempted to silence Com-
munists and Klansmen based on the effects of their political speech. 35
Even though most Americans would consider it indubitably harmful if
the American government were overthrown by force, or all nonwhite
races were subjugated, such speech is protected by the First Amend-
ment." 6 It is only sexually related speech that is considered too
dangerous. 37
Allowing speech to be prohibited on the grounds that it is too
offensive to certain geographically defined communities will impose
heavy burdens on members of some virtual communities. This effect
follows directly from the fact that only "shameful" lust or prurient
interest can be labelled obscene, while healthy, "normal" lust is ac-
ceptable.238 Those communities most likely to be considered "shame-
ful" by the majority will be the inevitable targets of obscenity
234. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,566-67 (1969) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
235. See supra note 130.
236. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
237. Of course, the line between "sexual" and "political" speech is often arbitrary. For
groups such as homosexuals, the assertion of one's sexuality is often as much a political act
as a sexual one. See STROSSEN, supra note 12, at 56-58 (arguing that attempting to draw a
line between "sexual" and "political" speech "ignores the significant overlap between
those categories made clear by the many major recent political controversies that have
centered on sexual issues").
238. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1985).
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prosecutions. 239 Thus, those speaking on topics such as homosexuality
will suffer from the indeterminacy of the subjective definitions of
"shameful" applied in various jurisdictions across the country to a
much greater extent than those discussing more "normal" topics.
Under this vague standard, it is inevitable that a zealous application of
the obscenity laws will silence speech in such communities far beyond
what the First Amendment should allow.
C. Regulating "Indecent" Speech: Protection of Minors and
Nonconsenting Adults
Prohibiting sexually related speech is not the only means by
which such speech can be regulated.24 The Court has developed in-
termediate standards by which sexually related speech can be limited
or channelled in certain ways, even if it cannot be absolutely prohib-
ited. These standards focus upon the protection of minors and non-
consenting adults from "indecent" speech and fall into the category of
time, place, and manner restrictions. 241
Minors can be shielded from material which is not obscene as to
adults.242 In general, content-based restrictions such as regulation of
sexually "indecent" materials "may be sustained only if the govern-
ment can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serv-
239. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 137 n.12 (1990) (noting that "the overwhelming
majority of arrests for violations of 'lewdness' laws involve male homosexuals"); SmRos-
SEN, supra note 12, at 217-47 (describing how hate speech laws have been used primarily
against minorities and Canada's recent pornography laws have been used primarily against
expression by lesbians).
240. In fact, neither Roth nor Miller require states to regulate obscenity. States are free
to leave sexual speech entirely unregulated. See State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 17 (Or. 1987)
(holding Oregon's constitution does not have an "obscenity" exception to its protection of
freedom of speech).
241. Such restrictions are valid when "they are justified without reference to the con-
tent of the regulated speech, . . . narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion." Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (citations
omitted); see also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). Although
time, place, and manner restrictions must generally be content neutral, in limited circum-
stances the government may "shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground
that they are more offensive than others, .. . [such as] when the speaker intrudes on the
privacy of the home .... or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling
viewer or auditor to avoid exposure." Id. (citations omitted).
242. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Ginsberg Court justified finding
material obscene as to minors by judging its appeal to minors. Id. at 643. The Court based
its decision upon the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rear-
ing of their children and the state's "independent interest in the well-being of its youth."
Id. at 639-40.
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ing a compelling state interest. 2 4 3  The Court has recognized a
"compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors." 244 This interest has been based upon both the
state's interest in allowing parents to control their children's exposure
to sexual material and an independent state interest in preventing
children from gaining access to sexual material regardless of the par-
ents' wishes.24
Regulations shielding minors from sexual material must be nar-
rowly drawn. First, states may not "reduce the adult population.., to
reading only what is fit for children."" 6 In addition, because minors
are also entitled to First Amendment protection, "only in relatively
narrow and well-defined circumstances may government bar public
dissemination of protected materials to them. ' 24 7 As a result, the gov-
ernment must choose the least restrictive means of furthering this in-
terest.2 48 Courts have repeatedly struck down complete prohibitions
on the sale of material to adults on the basis of protecting minors,249
and have found other regulations too vague in their application.250
Sufficiently drawn statutes or regulations, however, have been
upheld.251
243. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
244. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747,756-57 (1982); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1343 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) [hereinafter ACT 1].
245. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978).
246. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). (finding an ordinance unconstitu-
tional that made it an offense to make certain material available to the general reading
public and "not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal"); cf. Bantam
Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,71 (1963) ("[A]lthough the Commission's supposed concern
is limited to youthful readers.... adult readers are equally deprived of the opportunity to
purchase the publications.").
247. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975).
248. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
249. See id at 127-28 (ban on dial-a-porn); Butler, 352 U.S. at 382-83 (ban on printed
matter); Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213-14 (prohibition against nudity at a drive-in movie thea-
ter); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter ACT I1] (24 hour ban on indecent speech imposed upon broadcast media).
250. See Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689 (1968) ("Nor is it an
answer to an argument that a particular regulation of expression is vague to say that it was
adopted for the salutary purpose of protecting children."); Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 71.
251. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968); Carlin Communications v.
FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 556-57 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (upholding regula-
tions preventing minors from accessing dial-a-porn services). In fact, the Court's logic in
Sable leaves open the possibility that material protected by the First Amendment could be
completely banned as to adults if such a ban were the only way to protect minors. See
Sable, 492 U.S. at 126-29.
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The Court has also allowed restrictions to be placed upon mate-
rial to protect nonconsenting adults, although such restrictions are
more limited in permissible scope than those directed at the protec-
tion of children. In upholding such bans, the Court has required a
"showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an es-
sentially intolerable manner. '"1 s2 When adults are able to avoid "fur-
ther bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes,"
discarding reading material, or turning off a radio or television, courts
have not found the effect of speech on nonconsenting adults to be a
justification for time, place, or manner restraints. 3
Under an "indecency" approach, sexually explicit materials could
be regulated by separating sexual and nonsexual materials into sepa-
rate "areas" on an information service. The service could create spe-
cific fora for explicit discussion of sexual topics, and specific databases
for storage of explicit sexual materials. This would protect noncon-
senting adults from exposure to such material, because the placement
of explicit sexual discussion in separate fora will ensure that the user
must take affirmative steps to access the sexually explicit material.25 4
This type of system would protect unwilling adults from the risk of
being confronted with offensive, explicit sexual material every time
they use an information service.
252. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
253. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (quoting Cohen,
403 U.S. at 21); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,542 (1980);
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170, 174-76 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
ACT III].
One exception to this approach, however, is the Court's ruling in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, the Court justified FCC regulation of inde-
cent speech over broadcast media on the grounds that
[p]atently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the
citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home .... Because the
broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot com-
pletely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. To say
that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears inde-
cent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the
first blow.
Id. at 748-49. The result in Pacifica, however, was also justified because "broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children." Id. at 749. The Pacifica decision has since been character-
ized as an "emphatically narrow holding" and should not be read as a general justification
for regulating indecent speech to protect adults. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127. As the D.C. Cir-
cuit stated, "[w]e too are reluctant to recognize any generalized government interest in
protecting adults from indecent speech," even in another case dealing with indecency in
broadcasting. ACT 111, 11 F.3d at 175-76.
254. Cf. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28 ("In contrast to public displays, unsolicited mailings
and other means of expression which the recipient has no meaningful opportunity to avoid,
the dial-it medium requires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the
communication.").
Although regulating minors' access to sexual material presents a
more difficult problem, controlling the dissemination of material to
minors through appropriately drawn statutes or regulations can be ac-
complished with less detriment to free expression than will be caused
by application of the current "obscenity" test."5 By focusing on the
age of the user, network services providers could be freed from guess-
ing the user's locality. It would be easier to control the dissemination
of materials based upon the user's status as a minor than upon the
user's locality for two reasons. First, with the right software adapta-
tions, service providers can take reasonable steps to assure that only
adults are using their service. One's status as a minor will not change
until one reaches the age of majority. In contrast, no software adapta-
tion can continuously monitor the localities from which users are call-
ing, especially since those users may often have no fixed locality.
Second, the determination of whether a user is a minor or an adult is a
single bright-line standard. In contrast, the current obscenity test re-
quires a fine-grained determination of the chances of particular mate-
rial being deemed obscene under the differing standards of
innumerable localities. Given that it should be easier to regulate mi-
nors' access to sexual material than to attempt to censor the content
of such material, it is not surprising that some information services
have already taken steps in this direction." 6
In Miller, the Court argued that it would be as difficult to deter-
mine whether material is sexually explicit enough to merit a separate
forum as it would be to determine whether material is obscene.?s7
Even if one accepts this assertion as true, the consequences of chan-
neling speech via indecency regulations are less egregious than the
255. Any regulations prohibiting minors from adult fora would have to be narrowly
drawn. This would seem to be an easier problem than that encountered in broadcasting,
however, where adult users' interests in receiving material must be balanced against the
interest in prohibiting access to children. Where adult access is not an issue, the Court
seems to take a more deferential approach to the need to prevent children from accessing
sexual material. Compare ACT , 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) and ACT 11, 932 F.2d
1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) and ACT 111, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (illustrating the FCC's
problems with balancing adult rights against the interest in preventing minors from gaining
access to indecent broadcasting) with Sable, 492 U.S. at 126-31 (upholding regulation
prohibiting minors' access to indecent dial-a-porn services while permitting adult access to-
same services).
256. See Richard Louv, Coming of Age at 12 in Cyberspace, SAN DiEGo UNION-TRm.,
Mar. 12, 1994, at El (describing protection for youths available on America On-Line).
257. Chief Justice Warren Burger has argued that "state regulation of hard-core por-
nography so as to make it unavailable to non-adults.., has all the elements of 'censorship'
for adults; indeed even more rigid enforcement techniques may be called for." Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973).
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consequences of criminal punishment via obscenity laws. In speaking
on a sexual topic under a system of indecency regulations, the ques-
tion is not whether to speak but where to speak. When speech is chan-
neled, the user who is afraid that her speech is too explicit for general
use can still speak in the reserved fora without fear. In contrast, ob-
scenity laws are used to prevent speech altogether. In light of the
vague and indeterminable standard of "obscenity," a concerned user
must remain silent.
The difference between prohibiting speech and channeling speech
means that even if it is as difficult to determine which materials should
be channeled as it is to determine which materials should be prohib-
ited, the consequences of making an incorrect or overly broad deter-
mination are less serious when speech is channeled. While "general
audience" fora on information services may become overly sanitized
because of indecency regulations, adult users who wish to discuss sex-
ual topics will still be able to have such discussions elsewhere. Simi-
larly, while we should be concerned that youths not be arbitrarily
excluded from participation on computer networks, our concern with
youth access to sexual material is not as great as with adult access to
such material.
Rather than requiring communication services to examine every
piece of data that passes over their networks to see if it complies with
a vague and indeterminable obscenity standard, it is more reasonable
to focus on the creation of specialized fora to which only adult and
interested users are permitted access." 8 In such fora, users may be
free to engage in sexually explicit discussion without fear. Those who
would be offended by such discussion can avoid the specific fora yet
still fully participate in other fora of more interest to them. In addi-
tion to protecting the sensibilities of some users, this approach would
provide important protection for those creating "virtual" communities
dispersed across wide geographic areas by giving them the ability to
define their "boundaries" free from the harassment of individual ju-
ries in distant locales. Those who find sexual speech on certain topics
offensive would also have the ability to define their own standards,
although they would only be able to enforce those standards as to
material that they themselves might see.
258. Some of the commercial on-line services, such as CompuServe, Prodigy and
America Online have already taken steps in this direction. See David Hayes, Explicit Ma-
terial Put Back On-line: But CompuServe Gives Customers Power to Block Sites They Find
Offensive, KANSAS CrrY STAR, Feb. 14, 1996, at BI; Joel Kilsheimer, How Parents Can
Protect Children from Cyberporn, ORLANDo SENTINEL, July 11, 1995, at El.
As the Court has repeatedly noted, however, a regulation pur-
portedly designed to protect minors will not be upheld if it is over-
broad, vague, or if it is nothing more than a covert attempt to prohibit
adult access to sexual material.259 In addition, minors themselves are
not wholly exempt from First Amendment protection, and the govern-
ment must use the least restrictive means of preventing minors from
gaining access to indecent sexual discussion.26 Many of the current
proposals that seek to punish providers of computer services if a mi-
nor obtains sexual material seem to have ignored these constraints
and probably should be found unconstitutional even if they succeed in
becoming law.26'
Conclusion
The Miller obscenity test relies heavily on subjective judgments
such as whether speech is offensive in light of "community standards."
In the context of national computer networks, the test is so vague in
its application that it will force speakers on those networks to censor
constitutionally protected speech out of fear that some authority in
some locality may find such speech criminally sanctionable. The
Miller test relies upon assumptions about the nature of American soci-
ety which are no longer descriptively accurate. Further, such a test
has far more serious consequences for the right to speak freely than
the Court cares to admit.
Rooted in Justice Harlan's desire to grant the states greater con-
trol over speech, the use of "local" community standards in Miller's
obscenity test can no longer promote the "diversity" that the Court
assertedly seeks to foster. This reliance on "local" standards betrays
the fallacy underlying the Court's obscenity jurisprudence. The ob-
scenity exception to the First Amendment rests upon a view of the
community as a discrete, homogeneous, geographically defined locale.
This view of the community is incorrect when applied to our modern,
259. See supra text accompanying note 246.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 247-248.
261. On February 9, 1996, Congress enacted one such "indecency" proposal as the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133-36(1996) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h)). This most recent attempt at regulating
indecency on the Internet has been challenged and temporarily enjoined. ACLU v. Reno,
No. CIV.A.96-963, 1996 WL 65464 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1996); see Amy Harmon, Lobby
Emerging to Fight Restrictions on the Internet, L.A. TIMNES, Feb. 27, 1996, at D1; James
Coates, Telecommunications Act Spurs Cyberprotest, CHI. TRB., Feb. 9, 1996, at 1; see also
supra note 255 (discussing the difficulty involved in drawing appropriately narrow regula-
tions that balance the protection of minors against the rights of adults to engage in inde-
cent speech).
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highly integrated society, especially in light of computer networks' in-
creased communications capabilities and their potential to revolution-
ize human interaction. Instead of promoting diversity, the Court's
obscenity test actually forces speakers to accommodate the least toler-
ant community.
The Court's view of the community as a discrete, homogeneous
"hamlet" also underlies its decision to define obscenity as a question
of fact. Because "obscenity" is a factual question, the determination
of whether a work is too offensive is largely left to a jury. With the
development of international computer networks, the increased diver-
sity of opinion and experience that will follow from increased interac-
tion between formerly isolated localities makes it impossible to define
a predictable standard by which one can determine in advance
whether particular speech is so offensive as to be "obscene." Instead,
the impossibility of predicting the reactions of differing juries in differ-
ing locales will force both speakers and network service providers to
censor sexual speech according to arbitrary "safe" standards, thereby
eliminating much speech that is supposedly protected by the First
Amendment. Because there is effectively no way to isolate particu-
larly sensitive localities from any information on the computer net-
work, all speech on such networks must be censored according to the
demands of the most sensitive locality.
The "obscenity exception" to the First Amendment should be
abandoned. Its detrimental effect on constitutionally protected
speech will fall most heavily upon disfavored groups of individuals
who can be labelled "shameful" by an intolerant majority. Instead, by
appropriately narrow regulations, speech could be channeled to pro-
tect unwilling listeners from its offensiveness and to limit access to
sexual material by children. Channeling sexual speech, while not
prohibiting it, appropriately balances individuals' right to express
themselves and receive information with the society's interest in
preventing offense to adults and protecting minors.
